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Ratisukpimol, Watcharapong (Ph.D., Economics) 
A Theory and Some Empirics on Modern Maritime Piracy 
Thesis directed by Professor Murat Iyigun 
 
 This dissertation is composed of three studies on the root causes and determinants of 
modern maritime piracy. 
 The first chapter discusses the root and proximate causes of modern maritime piracy. It 
then presents a theoretical model of extralegal appropriation and production applied to maritime 
piracy. The model shows that (1) the lack of economic opportunities stimulates piracy by 
lowering its opportunity cost, (2) weak states raise the return to piracy due to a lack of protection 
of property rights in those states, and (3) the existence of piracy and its effectiveness impact the 
maritime trade. 
 The second chapter empirically examines the trends and determinants of modern-era 
piracy. It utilizes a new dataset of 3,362 maritime piracy incidents that occurred worldwide 
between 1998 and 2007. To test model predictions, the data cover detailed information on the 
location, timing, the number of pirates involved, the ship’s characteristics and success of each 
attack, as well as the material damage and violence inflicted upon the crew and the cargo. I 
combine this data with macroeconomic variables and the institutional quality of countries where 
piracy incidents occurred. I find the results strongly support the model in that economic and 
political factors do matter with the number of pirates involved in incidents, the success of attack 
and the property damage imposed. I also find that piracy incidents affect the regional maritime 
trade volume.  
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 The third chapter (coauthored with Murat Iyigun, my primary dissertation advisor) 
empirically focuses on the evolution of piracy attacks over time due to learning-by-doing and 
skill accumulation. We find that economic factors and the law do matter: higher per-capita 
incomes as well as more effective legal and political institutions dampen both the physical 
violence and material damage of modern-day piracy. But we also document significant learning-
by-doing and skill accumulation among the pirates: a history of successful piracy attacks locally 
improves the odds of success, making it more likely that pirates inflict more violence on the crew 
and take control of vessels in their entirety. The learning-by-doing effects are detectable even 
after controlling for our proxies for capital use and labor input.  
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INTRODUCTION
After being virtually extinct in the post Second World War era, maritime piracy
began to stage a gradual comeback starting in the mid-1990s, turning into an epidemic
that today, seriously aects sea trac, trade and commerce. There is a long and fairly
standard narrative as to why ancient piracy disappeared. Accordingly, it was the combi-
nation of faster and more technologically advanced merchant ships that could more easily
evade piracy attacks, increased naval presence by the rising colonial powers, better gov-
ernment supervision of maritime coasts as well as stricter international regulations that
accounted for the fall of conventional piracy. It is not too surprising that the rise of
modern maritime piracy is often explained as a corollary of the decline of some of these
factors, such as an increase in the number of failed or weak states in East Africa, lax
international maritime legislation, as well as technological advances in communications
and seafaring technologies which drastically reduced the costs of piracy in the modern
period. In this, the economic opportunity costs of piracy, by way of economically re-
tarded and weakening states, are also often highlighted as potential culprits. However,
systematic academic work on these hypotheses remains scant to non-existent.
Because of this scarcity in such work, this dissertation, \A Theory and Some Em-
pirics on Modern Maritime Piracy", examines the reappearance of the modern maritime
piracy. Specically, I investigate the root causes of modern maritime piracy. These in-
clude a discussion of the factors leading to piracy in two global hot spots: Somalia and
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the Southeast Asia region, augmenting a theoretical model of extralegal appropriation
and production to explain why economic conditions play an important role for modern-
day piracy, and then testing the validity of that model empirically by employing the
novel dataset of modern piracy incidents.
(1) Modeling the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
The main purposes of this chapter are (1) to present the factors which are im-
portant in shaping piracy and (2) to present a theoretical model applied to maritime
piracy by developing the extralegal appropriation and production model. In the model,
an individual can choose between productive employment providing labor income and
subversive activity which in this case takes the form of piracy. In the production sector,
the fraction of the exported goods is expropriated during the transportation. I show
that, in equilibrium, the time that average family allocates to extralegal activity is in-
creasing in its eectiveness, in the resource endowment, and in the proportion of exports,
but decreasing in the number of families, in the wage of productive activity, and in the
number of cargo ships. I also characterize the probability of the successful attack and the
piracy prot. These ndings help explain why economic conditions play an important
role for modern-day piracy. Furthermore, I analyze the production sector and show that
the subsistence of piracy and its eectiveness reduce the incentive to trade.
(2) Understanding the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
The purpose of the second chapter is to test the validity of the model presented
in Chapter 1 by presenting an empirical analysis of the determinants of modern piracy.
It employs a new dataset of 3,362 maritime piracy incidents that occurred worldwide
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between 1998 and 2007. The data cover detailed information on the location, timing,
the number of pirates involved, the vessel's characteristics and success of each attack, as
well as the material damage and violence inicted upon the crew and the cargo. I combine
these data with macroeconomic and aggregate measures on per-capita incomes, rates of
economic growth, unemployment rate and institutional quality of countries where piracy
incidents occurred. In it, I nd the results strongly support the model in that economic
and political factors do play a role in the number of pirates involved in attacks and the
probability of the successful attack. But economic factors also seem to alter the outcome
of modern piracy attacks; accordingly, higher per-capita incomes are associated with
fewer successful attacks that culminated with cash robberies and vessel hijackings, while
they are related more frequently to cases with cargo goods robbery and ransom demand. I
also nd that political institutions and legal enforcement are important factors, although
not as much nor consistently as economic factors.
(3) Learning Piracy on the High Seas
This last chapter is coauthored with my dissertation advisor. We focus on the
evolution of piracy attacks over time due to learning-by-doing and skills accumulation.
The central result is that, even after controlling for geographic, economic and sociopolit-
ical factors as well as a variety of xed eects, learning-by-doing and skills accumulation
among the pirates seemed to have played an important role in maritime piracy turning
into a more potent threat over time. In particular, we nd that a history of successful
piracy attacks locally improves the odds of future success in piracy, making it more likely
that pirates launch successful raids aimed at larger vessels closer to land. The learning-
by-doing eects are detectable even after controlling for our proxies for capital use and
3
labor input (the number of pirates).
4
CHAPTER 1
Modeling the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
1.1 Introduction
Oceans and seas provide relatively cheap transportation of goods and services. From
the earliest times, movement of cargo across open water has attracted predation by pi-
rates. Since the early 1990s, modern maritime piracy has become one of the major
threats to sea commerce. Numerous pirate attacks have caused serious physical and eco-
nomic harm, aecting international trade, economics, and politics. Several international
organizations including the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) as well as the governments of trading countries are at-
tempting to coordinate multinational eorts to stem piracy. However, the problem of
piracy continues to spread because all of these entities have not implemented eective
policing eorts.
Maritime Piracy, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) of 1982, consists of any criminal acts of violence, detention, or depredation
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship (or aircraft)
that is directed on the high seas against another ship, aircraft, or against persons or
property on board a ship (or aircraft). Piracy can also be committed against a ship,
aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State (IMB,
2008).
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Acts of piracy can be dated back to the fourteenth century BCE o the coast of
what is now Turkey. The Golden Age of Piracy occurred from the end of seventeenth
century to the beginning of eighteenth century. It was a peak period since many ships
carried slaves from Africa to America and carried sugar, rum and other goods from
the Americas to Europe.1 Currently, modern pirates can be successful because a large
amount of international commerce occurs via shipping. For commercial reasons, many
cargo ships move through narrow bodies of water such as the Suez Canal, the Panama
Canal, and the Strait of Malacca. As usage increases, many of these ships have to lower
cruising speeds to allow for navigation and trac control, making them prime targets
for piracy.2
In this paper, I analyze the root causes of modern maritime piracy which mainly
takes place in two global hot spots: Somalia and the Southeast Asia region. I then
augment a conceptual model of extralegal appropriation and production applied to mar-
itime piracy. The model indicates that opportunity cost of engaging extralegal activities,
which is wage employment in the legal production sector, and a lack of enforcement of
the law both lower the threshold wage employment below which piracy becomes attrac-
tive. This application helps to formalize the conjectures on the determinant of modern
maritime piracy.
In the model, the indigenous population can divide their time between wage em-
ployment in the productive employment sector, or subversive activity (being a pirate).
Part of production, which is exported through maritime transportation, is subject to
extralegal appropriation. I show that, in equilibrium, the allocation of time to extralegal
1\Tracing the Golden Age of Piracy" by Casey Sheehan (2010) at
http://www.cindyvallar.com/tracinggoldenage.html.
2\Modern Day Pirates" by PirateReport.org (2010) at http://www.piratereport.org/modern-day-
pirates.
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appropriation is increasing in its eectiveness, in the resource endowment, and in the
proportion of exports, but it is decreasing in the indigenous population, in the wage
rate in production, and in the number of cargo ships. The model shows that the lack of
economic opportunities stimulates piracy by lowering its opportunity cost. It also shows
that weak states raise the return to piracy due to a lack of protection of property rights
in those states. This model is laying the foundation of the empirical analysis of the root
causes of modern maritime piracy which will be presented in the next chapter.
The basic theoretical model explaining why economic conditions play an important
role for modern-day piracy is based on the political economy literature on production and
extralegal appropriation. The main objectives are to identify the factors that determine
resource allocation between productive and appropriative activities and the equilibrium
distortion of resources and income. The model developed in this chapter adds to a
growing literature that analyzes conict over the control of property and income within
the framework of general equilibrium. The model was originated by Haavelmo (1954)
and further developed by follow-up papers such as Hirshleifer (1991), Grossman (1994),
Grossman and Kim (1995), Grossman and Iyigun (1995, 1997), Skaperdas (1992, 2005),
Bates et al. (2002), Hafer (2006) and Caruso (2007).
The next section briey discusses the root causes of modern maritime piracy in
Somalia and Southeast Asia region, and then presents the theory on modern maritime
piracy.
1.2 Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
Until the 1980s, piracy was commonly considered mostly extinct, but the 1990s has
seen a resurrection of maritime piracy. Since a majority of modern piracy acts occur in
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the vicinity of Somalia and Southeast Asia, and an important potential culprit of modern
piracy relates to weak institutional infrastructure, in what follows I review the literature
explaining root causes of modern-day piracy. There is speculation that the presence of
weak or failed states is the main cause of maritime piracy incidents on East Africa and
Southeast Asia (See Sherman 2009, Folsum 2009, Uher 2009, Webber 2009 and Tran
2009).
Piracy o the African shore was a rare occurrence until the 1990s, when many
African countries including Somalia fell into political and economic chaos. Many of the
problems that plague the African continent either stem from the consequence of European
colonization or the Cold War between the West and Soviet Union (Tran, 2009). In 1991,
the Somali Civil War took place. Since then and now, Somalia still lacks a central
government and the interim government is virtually powerless to stop piracy. Somalia's
devolution advanced over two decades because of several factors; Somalia is one of the
poorest countries in the world, with a totally ineective central government.
Since the early 1990s, there have been at least 14 failed Somali central governments
in two decades (Sherman, 2009). Somalia is controlled by a clan system of efdoms, with
warlords and their cronies running the show as opposed to one central government, each
with a leadership and quasi-military structure of its own. Major destruction and mayhem
followed the civil war, and the country has not recuperated yet, with a great majority
of the population facing famine. In a land so brutally lawless, it was only a matter of
time before the growing and more powerful gangs turned to ocean piracy. Some of the
more organized clans have total control over various areas. Except for the warlords,
gang leaders, weapons smugglers and ocean-going pirates, most of the population of
Somalia exists in dire poverty. The average per-capita income in Somalia is $400 a
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year (Sherman, 2009). The warlords needed to expand their hunt for money and other
resources to strengthen their forces and to expand control of territories. Enter the modern
day pirates, and migration towards the coastal waters rises, desperate young men are
suddenly given a chance to feed their families. Now, more and more clans established
themselves as pirates, riding out in the high seas in old, antiquated shing boats and
attacking the most modern vessels that dare to navigate Indian Ocean.
Moreover, geographically speaking, Somalia is located on the mouth of Gulf of
Aden, which is by all means one of the most crucial shipping route in the world. After
the successful attack and bringing in a few million US dollars in ransoms, the clan system
continues to grow stronger as they accumulate more wealth, buy arms and improve
technology in targeting vessels. With more wealth, they will be able to bring even more
men into their folds, possibly strengthening the piracy industry in Somalia (Babineau,
2009).
The consequences of being a failed state led other nations to take advantage of
Somalia. According to Sherman (2009), maritime piracy did not only evolve from clan
activity, but also from the country's shing activity. The large, highly-sophisticated
shing eets from Japan, Russia and other developed countries constantly violated the
legal waters around Somalia and began to wipe out entire sh population in Indian
Ocean. Their actions were destroying the traditional shery. Moreover, many foreign
ships used the area to dump their highly toxic refuse, thereby accelerating the devastating
process of destroying all marine creatures. Attempting to protect their territorial water,
some Somali shermen organized into bands of raiders, and boarded nearby ships, forcing
those ships'crews to compensate for the income loss from mass shing operations. Given
their success in collecting tributes, the powerful clan in Somalia decided to expand on
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the local shermen' idea of demanding money from intruders. Until the large nations
began to send armed vessels recently, pirates had a virtually free ride for more than a
decade (Sherman, 2009).
The International Maritime Bureau (2010) proposed a solution to stop the surge
of piracy on Somalia. There was a desperate need for a stable infrastructure in this area.
It continues to be vital that governments and the United Nations devote resources to
developing workable administrative infrastructures to prevent criminals from exploiting
the vacuum left from years of failed local government. All measures taken at sea to limit
pirates' attacks are undermined due to a lack of responsible authority in Somalia, where
the pirates begin their voyage and then return with hijacked vessels (IMB, 2010).
The second hot spot, Southeast Asia, particularly the South China Sea and Malacca
Strait, is vulnerable to pirate attacks. The region's geography and importance as a
strategic trade route create narrow waterways densely packed with a number of cargo
ships carrying goods and energy resources to all of Asia. Ninety percent of the world's
trade moves by ship and one-third of the world's shipping moves through Southeast
Asia's waters (Bulkeley, 2003).
A main root cause of Southeast Asian maritime piracy is a weak political control
in the region. Pirates in Southeast Asia region can be divided into two groups: (1)
opportunistic sea-robbers, involved in small scale attacks, and (2) sophisticated organized
pirate gangs, responsible for hijacking and kidnapping. Both types can conduct attacks
because they exploit security shortcomings in the maritime environment and benet from
political, social, and economic development, which encourage attacks (Liss, 2010).
Literature surrounding maritime piracy in Southeast Asia has tended to fall into
two categories: policy-oriented that largely ignores or glosses over a rich, informative,
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historical socio-political-cultural context, and historical accounts of piracy that are not
related to contemporary phenomena, generally remaining isolated in the past (Young,
2004). The consequences of being a weak state have driven the existence of maritime
piracy into several outcomes such as over-shing, lax maritime regulations, the existence
of organized crime syndicates, the presence of radical politically motivated groups, and
widespread poverty (Liss, 2010). Although Southeast Asian countries recovered after the
1997 economic crisis, poverty is still widespread. For those among the more desperate
left behind in the region, who live close to the sea shore, piracy can be an alternative
source of income. Frecon (2006) argues that poverty and the lack of other employment
opportunities are the most important motivations for people to become pirates. Actually,
those involved in piracy are often unemployed sailors, shers, or taxi-boat drivers who
do not nd a sucient number of passengers during the day to make a living (Frecon,
2005).
In addition, lack of regional cooperation can explain this subsistence on maritime
piracy. Smaller developing nations cannot defend against pirate attacks occurring within
their jurisdiction. Local authorities in areas such as Malaysia and Indonesia are not
equipped with the technology and resources to combat pirates. While Singapore and
Malaysia have increased their army forces, Indonesia, in particular, needs help in reducing
pirate activities. This corresponds to Mo's (2002) suggestion that the most eective way
to combat maritime piracy in Southeast Asia is regional cooperation, but the lack of
cooperation is still a problem.
11
1.3 Theoretical Framework
1.3.1 Individual Choice
Consider the following model of a representative economy. Assume that the resource
endowment of this economy is given, !. The economy uses resources to produce the good
for domestic consumption and exports to another economy by water transportation. Let
t be the proportion of the resource produced for domestic consumption , 0 < t < 1.
Thus, exports are (1   t)! . The population of the economy consists of N identical
indigenous families. Each family can divide its time between productive and subversive
activities. Specically, each indigenous family is endowed with one unit of time of which
it allocates the fraction f , 0  f  1, to wage employment and the fraction p, 0  p  1,
to subversive activity. The productive activity (being a farmer) is a wage employment
oered by producers. Workers in this sector produce the good for domestic consumption
and export.
The income of a family from productive activity is wff where wf is the wage rate
of each unit time of labor and f is the fraction of its time that this family allocates to
productive activity. Dene p as the fraction of the time that family allocates to subversive
activity (being a pirate). That is,
f + p = 1 (1)
In subversive activity, pirates attack cargo ships containing exported goods pro-
duced in the economy from productive activity. Assume that the exported good is split
into R identical cargo ships exporting from this country. The total piracy income is
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(1  t)! where  is the price of good produced and  is the fraction of cargo lost due
to the attack; 0   < 1.
The total income from attacking cargo ships is divided among all families pro-
portionately to the time allocated by each family to subversive activity. Therefore, the
income of a family from attacking cargo ships is 

(1 t)!
N
p
P

where P is the fraction of
its time that the average family allocates to being a pirate. Thus, the total income of a
family, i, is given by
i = wff + 
 
(1  t)!
N
p
P
!
(2)
Each family takes wf and 

(1 t)!
NP

as given and chooses f and p, subject to
the constraint f + p = 1, to maximize i. The Kuhn-Tucker condition for maximizing i
implies
p =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if wf > 

(1 t)!
NP

[0; 1] if wf = 

(1 t)!
NP

1 if wf < 

(1 t)!
NP

(3)
and
f  = 1  p (4)
Equation (3) indicates that, other things being equal, each family would allocate
all of the time to only one activity if the returns to that activity are greater than the
return to the other activity. Each family would allocate time to both activities only if
the returns to both activities are equal.
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1.3.2 Subversive Technology
Recall that  is simply the probability that the cargo ship will get attacked. In
the absence of protection, let us assume that it is an increasing and concave in NP
R
which is the total time that all families allocate to extralegal activity per ship. A simple
technology of attacking vessels that incorporates this assumption is
 =
x
1 + x
where x = 
NP
R
;   0 (5)
In equation (5), the parameter  determines the eectiveness of time allocated to
subversive activity in appropriating the cargo goods.
In equilibrium, since all families are identical, p is equal to P ,which is the fraction
of its time that the average family allocates to being a pirate, and f is equal to F ,
which is the fraction of its time that the average family allocates to productive activity.
Therefore, the average family would allocate the time according to
P  =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if wf >
(1 t)!
R
(1 t)!
Rwf
 1
N
R
if
(1 t)!
R
1+N
R
< wf <
(1 t)!
R
1 if wf <
(1 t)!
R
1+N
R
(6)
and
F  = 1  P  (7)
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Proposition 1 The time that the average family allocates to extralegal appropriation,
P , is increasing in its eectiveness, , in the resource endowment, !, in the price of
good, , and in the proportion of exports, (1   t), but it is decreasing in the indigenous
population, N , in the return of a legal job, wf , and in the number of cargo ships, R.
Proof.
By comparative static analysis,
Since P =
(1 t)!
Rwf
 1
N
R
=
(1 t)! Rwf
Nwf
, I have
@P
@
= R
N2
> 0
@P
@!
= (1 t)
Nwf
> 0
@P
@
= (1 t)!
Nwf
> 0
@P
@(1 t) =
!
Nwf
> 0
@P
@N
=  
h
(1 t)! Rwf
N2wf
i
< 0
@P
@wf
=  
"
(1 t)!
N(wf)
2
#
< 0
@P
@R
=   1
N
< 0
The results from the proposition are straightforward and make economic sense.
One may wonder why the time allocation for subversive activities is decreasing in the
number of cargo ships. More ships sent with exports on board should be more attractive
to the pirates. The reason seems to be dier from the common assumption. For a given
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level of subversive technology, more ships mean fewer resources devoted to piracy attacks
per ship. This, however, lowers success probability (or share of resources captured by
pirates). In turn, this makes piracy even less attractive.
In equation (5), substituting x into the success contest function, I obtain
 =
NP
R + NP
(8)
Plugging P  from the individual optimization in equation (6) into the contest
success function in equation (8), I obtain
 = 1  Rwf
(1  t)! (9)
Proposition 2 The success of attack, , is increasing in the time that average family
allocates to subversive activity, P , in the resource endowment, !, in the price of good,
, in the proportion of exports, (1  t), and in the eectiveness of time allocated to be a
pirate, , but decreasing in the return of a legal job, wf , and in the number of ships, R.
Proof.
By comparative static analysis,
From equation (8), since  = NP
R+NP
, I have
@
@P
= RN
(R+NP )2
> 0
From equation (9), since  = 1  Rwf
(1 t)! , I have
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@
@!
=
Rwf
(1 t)(!)2 > 0
@
@
=
Rwf
(1 t)!()2 > 0
@
@(1 t) =
Rwf
(1 t)2! > 0
@
@
=
Rwf
2(1 t)! > 0
@
@wf
=   R
(1 t)! < 0
@
@R
=   wf
(1 t)! < 0
Success of attack does not imply that pirates can appropriate properties on board.
Pirates can successfully board ships but leave empty handed because of the crew alert.
Now I consider the success of appropriation on economic outcomes. In order to model
the success of theft, I introduce piracy prots as a proxy since prots come not only from
hiring the optimal number of pirates, but also from liquidating appropriated goods in
the market. In the following section, I analyze the labor market for pirates and derive
the determinants of prots from piracy.
1.3.3 Competitive Labor Market of Pirate Firms
Assume that, with the large number of indigenous families, the labor market for
pirates is competitive.3 Output (cargo appropriated) is obtained from using pirates with
the technology p; 0 <  < 1; where p is the unit of labor time of pirating and  is a
parameter reecting productivity as well as the relative price of the goods produced by
3I assume the labor market of pirates is in perfect competition since it corresponds to the literatures
on maritime piracy that claim that several clans have established themselves as pirates.
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the economy. Given this technology, the gross prot obtained from attacking one ship is
 = p   wpp: Recall from individual optimization that wp = 

(1 t)!
NP

: Substitute
wp = 

1 t)!
NP

into the prot function, which becomes
 = p   
 
1  t)!
NP
!
p (10)
The pirate rms take 

1 t)!
NP

and  as given and choose p to maximize . This
maximization implies that p satises
p =
 
NP
(1  t)!
! 1
1 
(11)
The market-clearing condition for the labor market is that labor demand (the unit
of labor time of pirates times the number of cargo ships) is equal to the labor supply
(the fraction of time that the average family allocates to piracy times the number of
families).4 That is,
pR = NP (12)
Taken together, equations (11) and (12) imply that the market-clearing wage rate
equals the marginal product of labor:

NP
R
1 
=
h
(1 t)!
NP
i (13)
4Recall that R is a number of total ships in the vicinity. This information is well known for both
production and appropriation sectors. In this simple model, I assume that pirates will attack all R
ships.
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wp =
"
(1  t)!
NP
#
=
h
NP
R
i1  (14)
Substitute the rst-order and market-clearing conditions into the prot function.
 = 

NP
R

 
264 
NP
R
1 
375NP
R

(15)
Therefore, prots from attacking each cargo ship are
 = (1  )

NP
R

(16)
Plugging P  from the individual optimization in equation (6) into the prot func-
tion above, I obtain
 = (1  )
"
(1  t)!
Rwf
  1

#
(17)
Proposition 3 The piracy prots, , are increasing in the number of pirates, P , in
the price of cargo goods, , in the resource endowment, !, in the proportion of exports,
(1  t), and in the eectiveness of time allocated to be a pirate, , but decreasing in the
return of a legal job, wf , and in the number of ships, R.
Proof.
By comparative static analysis,
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From equation (16), since  = (1  )

NP
R

,
@
@P
= (1  )

NP
R
 1 
N
R

> 0
From equation (17), since  = (1  )
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i
,
@
@
= (1  )


h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i 1 (1 t)!
Rwf
+
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i
> 0
@
@!
= (1  )
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i 1 h(1 t)
Rwf
i
> 0
@
@(1 t) = (1  )
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i 1 h
!
Rwf
i
> 0
@
@
= (1  )
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i 1 h
1
2
i
> 0
@
@wf
= (1  )
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i 1 h (1 t)!
R(wf )2
i
< 0
@
@R
= (1  )
h
(1 t)!
Rwf
  1

i 1 h (1 t)!
wf (R)2
i
< 0
I also extend this analysis by assuming a monopsonized labor market of pirates and
compare the results with the case of perfectly competitive labor market. The analysis
shows that the comparative static analysis does not alter the results.
1.3.4 Exporter's Problem
Now, consider the productive sector in which the fraction of output produced is
exported. Let M denote the prots of exports net of extralegal appropriation and the
net of the cost of ship protection. Thus,
M = (1  )(1  t)!   gR (18)
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where (1  )(1  t)! is revenue from successfully selling exported good and g is
the marginal cost of ship protection from pirates. The country chooses the number of
ships sent to other trading countries, R, and takes , N , P , (1   t)! and g as given in
order to maximize M . The constraint on this maximization problem is the subversive
technology of extralegal appropriation, given by equation (5). Substitute equation (5)
into the prot function, which becomes
M =
 
R
R + NP
!
(1  t)!   gR (19)
The rst-order condition is
@M
@R
=
(1  t)!NP
(R + NP )2
  g = 0 (20)
Solving for R, I obtain
R =
s
(1  t)!NP
g
  NP (21)
with the restriction (1 t)!
g
 NP to ensure a nonnegative value of R. This
implies that a country will send ships out for export if the ratio of the value of export
per cost of ship protection is greater than or equal to the eectiveness of total time all
the population allocate to extralegal activity.
The second-order condition is also satised as
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@2M
@R2
=  2(1  t)!NP
(R + NP )3
< 0 (22)
Proposition 4 The optimal number of ships sent for export, R, is increasing in the
resource endowment, ! , in the proportion of exports, (1   t), and in the price of good,
, but it is decreasing in the cost of ship protection, g. However, it is decreasing in the
eectiveness of time allocated to be a pirate, , and in the labor supply of pirates, NP ,
when NP < (1 t)!
g
< 4NP .
Proof.
By comparative static analysis,
Since R =
r
(1 t)!NP
g
  NP , I have
@R
@!
= 1
2
q
(1 t)!NP
g
(1 t)NP
g
> 0
@R
@(1 t) =
1
2
q
(1 t)!NP
g
!NP
g
> 0
@R
@
= 1
2
q
(1 t)!NP
g
(1 t)!NP
g
> 0
@R
@g
= 1
2
q
(1 t)!NP
g
 (1 t)!NP
g2
< 0
@R
@
= 1
2
q
(1 t)!NP
g
(1 t)!NP
g
 NP
@R
@
< 0 if and only if NP < (1 t)!
g
< 4NP
and @R

@
> 0 if and only if (1 t)!
g
> 4NP
@R
@NP
= 1
2
q
(1 t)!NP
g
(1 t)!
g
  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@R
@NP
< 0 if and only if NP < (1 t)!
g
< 4NP
and @R

@NP
> 0 if and only if (1 t)!
g
> 4NP
Substitute R from equation (21) into the prot function in equation (19).
The exporter's prots are
M = (1  t)!   2
q
(1  t)!NPg + NPg (23)
Proposition 5 The exporter's prots, M, are increasing in the resource endowment, !
, in the proportion of exports, (1 t), and in the price of good, , but it is decreasing in the
time that average family allocates to subversive activity, P , in the cost of ship protection,
g, in the eectiveness of time allocated to be a pirate, , and in the population, N .
Proof.
Recall that we have a restriction (1 t)!
g
 NP to ensure a nonnegative value of
R.
By comparative static analysis,
Since M = (1  t)!   2
q
(1  t)!NPg + NPg, I have
@M
@!
= (1  t)  1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)NPg
@M
@!
< 0 if and only if (1  t)  1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)NPg < 0
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which implies (1 t)!
g
< NP
This is a contradiction. Therefore, @M

@!
> 0
@M
@(1 t) = !   1p(1 t)!NPg  !NPg
@M
@(1 t) < 0 if and only if !   1p(1 t)!NPg  !NPg < 0
which implies (1 t)!
g
< NP
This is a contradiction. Therefore, @M

@(1 t) > 0
@M
@
= (1  t)!   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!NPg
@M
@
< 0 if and only if (1  t)!   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!NPg < 0
which implies (1 t)!
g
< NP
This is a contradiction. Therefore, @M

@
> 0
@M
@P
=   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!Ng + Ng
@M
@P
< 0 if and only if   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!Ng + Ng < 0
which implies (1 t)!
g
> NP
Therefore, @M

@P
< 0
@M
@g
=   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!NP + NP
@M
@g
< 0 if and only if   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!NP + NP < 0
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which implies (1 t)!
g
> NP
Therefore, @M

@g
< 0
@M
@
=   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!NPg +NPg
@M
@
< 0 if and only if   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!NPg +NPg < 0
which implies (1 t)!
g
> NP
Therefore, @M

@
< 0
@M
@N
=   1p
(1 t)!NPg  (1  t)!Pg + Pg
@M
@N
< 0 if and only if
which implies (1 t)!
g
> NP
Therefore, @M

@N
< 0
This analysis suggests that the existence of piracy and its higher eectiveness will
reduce the incentive to trade by sending fewer ships out.
1.4 Conclusion
The theory sketched above provides suggestive implications about the economics of
extralegal appropriation, which in this case takes the form of piracy. This paper presents
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the root causes of modern maritime piracy which mostly occur in two regions: Soma-
lia and the Southeast Asia. Either being failed or weak states is the real root cause
explaining the rise of modern maritime piracy. To support these hypotheses, I develop
the theoretical framework of extralegal appropriation and the production model. The
model signies that the opportunity cost of engaging extralegal activities can be viewed
as wage employment in the legal production sector, and that a lack of enforcement of the
law both lower the threshold wage employment below which piracy becomes attractive.
In the model, the indigenous population can divide their time between wage employ-
ment in the productive employment sector, or subversive activity (being a pirate). Parts
of production, which are exported through maritime transportation, are subject to ex-
tralegal appropriation. I show that, in equilibrium, the allocation of time to extralegal
appropriation is increasing in its eectiveness, in the resource endowment, and in the
proportion of exports, but it is decreasing in the indigenous population, in the wage rate
in production, and in the number of cargo ships. These factors also play a signicant
role in determining the probability of successful attacks and piracy prots. Considering
the supply side, I explore the production sector when facing pirates during exportation
to determine the optimal trade value. I also show that existence of piracy and its higher
eectiveness aect maritime trade volume. Based on this theoretical framework, the ex-
tralegal activities are aected by economic incentives. Therefore, the rise of modern-era
maritime piracy is inversely related to the economic conditions of regions from which
modern pirates emerge. This application helps to formalize the conjectures on the deter-
minant of modern maritime piracy. This model is laying the foundation of the empirical
analysis of the root causes of modern maritime piracy in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
Understanding the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
2.1 Introduction
When hearing the word \pirates", most people imagine cruel men with the eye
patches and green parrots on their shoulders. But maritime piracy is one of the oldest
criminal professions, which made a deadly comeback in the early 1990s and became a
serious global threat to sea commerce.
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the total number
of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships, reported to have occurred or
to have been attempted from 1984 to the end of December 2010, is 6,078. Up to that
date, the number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in 2010 reported
was 445, an increase of 35 (8.54%) over the number reported in 2009. The following
seven locations recorded nearly 75% of all attacks from a total of 445 incidents reported
in 2010, Somalia, Gulf of Aden, Indonesia, South China Sea, Red Sea, Bangladesh and
Nigeria. Not surprisingly, eighty percent of international maritime freight travel is largely
unguarded and only one percent of maritime pirates get arrested (Maggio, 2007).5
International Maritime Bureau (2010) claims that A total of 219 incidents in 2010
was attributed to Somali pirates. These incidents continue to threaten an extended
5\Maritime Piracy: Poverty in lawless lands breeds a new era of piracy on the seas" by TakePart,
LLC (2010) at http://www.takepart.com/issues/maritime-piracy/16433
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geographical region. Attacks by Somali pirates cover a vast area, which includes the
Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea, o Yemen, o Oman, Arabian Sea, o Kenya, o
Tanzania, o Seychelles, o Madagascar, o Mozambique, the Indian Ocean, o the
Indian west coast and o the Maldives west coast. Most of the attacks involve the
use of lethal weapons, which is a cause of great concern to the merchant navy eet
since it poses a serious threat not only to injury and death of seafarers but also to
the ship, cargo and environment. Another concern regarding Somali pirates' attacking
behavior is that they are using more hijacked ocean going shing vessels and hijacked
merchant vessels to conduct piracy operations. This has greatly enhanced the ability
of pirates to attack many unsuspecting passing vessels. Skis are launched from the
hijacked vessels, which quickly intercept and attack innocent vessels resulting in some
vessels being hijacked. Being in control of these hijacked vessels, the pirates are no
longer limited by capability and there is no boundary that can constrain the pirates
given enough fuel onboard. Attacks in the Gulf of Aden have dropped by more than
fty percent due to the international naval patrols and positive actions of the seafarers.
Nevertheless, in other parts o Somalia, including the Red Sea and the wider Indian
Ocean where naval patrols are not covered, attacks have gone up substantially (IMO,
2010).
Corresponding with this rise are the violence inicted on the crews and the material
damage from attacks between 1991 and 2010, during this period 390 crew members were
killed, 945 crew members were reportedly injured/assaulted, 7,111 crew members were
reportedly taken hostage or kidnapped; and 203 crew members went missing. Assaults on
crews were typically involved by groups of ve to ten pirates, some of whom were heavily
armed. More people were taken hostage at sea in 2010 than in any year since records
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began. Pirates captured 1,181 seafarers and killed eight. Fifty-three ships were hijacked.
The gures for the number of hostages and vessels taken are the highest ever seen. As
a percentage of global incidents, piracy on the high seas has increased dramatically over
armed robbery in territorial waters (IMO, 2010).
Despite these gures, maritime piracy incidents are underreported by as much as
fty percent (Chalk, 2008). Statistical data provides an overall view of the problem but
it is by no means an accurate indicator of the actual criminal activity that takes place
(Kellerman, 1998). Why are not all piracy cases reported to international organizations?
First, port authorities are likely to dock the ship and its crew while they investigate
the attack. Thus, if the cost to do so exceeds the sustained loss, the ship owners are
unlikely to report. In 1997, investigation costs amounted to $10,000 per day whereas
Abhyankar (1999) estimates that the average loss per attack to be approximately $5,000.
Also, higher insurance costs and salaries for future crews can be a factor in maritime
companies not to report. If local law enforcement is suspected of being in league with
the pirates or is turning a blind eye to their activities, then the likelihood of the attack
being reported is again very low. Gottschalk et al. (2000) calculate that those losses
amounted to $0.32 for every $10,000 of goods shipped in 1997. Overall, the nancial
incentive for shipping companies to address the issue are not too high.
In this chapter, I examine the economic and political determinants of modern-day
piracy empirically. In order to do so, I test the empirical implications of the model pre-
sented in Chapter 1. In the model, the maritime piracy incidents represent the subversive
activity and the resources devoted for extralegal appropriation are the labor inputs used
for piracy. Data include 3,362 worldwide modern-day piracy incidents that occurred
between 1998 and 2007. I have detailed information on the location, region, timing and
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success of each attack, as well as the material damage and violence inicted upon the
crew and the cargo. I combine these incident-based data with macroeconomic and ag-
gregate measures on per-capita incomes, rates of economic growth, the unemployment
rate and institutional quality of countries where the incident took place. I also incorpo-
rate the number of pirates involved and the vessel characteristics (the gross registered
tonnage (GRT), ags, type of vessels) for each incident.
Empirical study reveals the following ndings. First, the results t the theoretical
model well in that economic factors play a signicant role in the number of pirates,
the success of the attack and the property damage inicted. For instance, higher real
per-capita incomes and lower unemployment rates tend to reduce the number of pirates.
Political institutions are also important in explaining this phenomenon. For example,
the incidents that occur in a country with greater political freedom tend to have a lower
number of pirates and incidents that do occur in the territories of more democratic
countries have a reduced chance of successful attacks. Incidents that take place in more
democratic locations also tend to involve fewer cases in which pirates board the ship and
ask for ransom.
However, there are not many studies in quantitative economics that focus on mod-
ern maritime piracy. Given the limited amount of work, there are few papers that analyze
this phenomenon in the following aspects. Maggio (2007) estimates the damage caused
by maritime piracy and armed robbery and reveals that piracy and hijackings cost world
shipping and industry around $16-$25 billion a year. Bowden (2010) conducts a large-
scale study to quantify the cost of piracy, which are the sum of direct nancial costs and
secondary (macroeconomic) costs. Direct nancial costs of piracy consist of ransoms,
insurance premiums, the costs of re-routing to avoid piracy regions, deterrent security
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equipment, naval forces, piracy prosecutions, and organization budgets dedicated to re-
ducing piracy. The secondary (macroeconomic) costs include costs to regional trade,
shing and oil industries, cost food price ination, and reduced foreign revenue. Based
on her calculations, Bowden asserts that maritime piracy is costing the international
economy between $7 to $12 billion per year. Nevertheless, Murphy (2007) warns against
exaggerating the threat posed by maritime pirates. He notes that even $16 billion in
losses is a minimal amount compared to annual global maritime trade value, which is in
the trillions of dollars. This also explains why shipping companies do not give a serious
attention to this threat. Despite this fact, this terrorism cannot be negligible since mar-
itime piracy incidents sometimes occur in international waters beyond the reach of the
law in key locations that can aect the global security of nations around the world as
well as the world economy.
Moreover, Mejia et al. (2009) focus on the randomness of maritime piracy. They
estimate the probability that the cargo ship will be attacked by using a Probit model
and the results show that both ags of registry and types of vessel are signicant factors
explaining maritime piracy. They also inquire whether there is a dierence in the prob-
ability of being attacked between ships that y Asian ags and those that y non-Asian
ags. Thus, piracy is clearly non-randomly selected.
Another quantitative analysis on the modern maritime piracy focuses on political
institutions and state status. Hastings (2009) explores whether the dierence between
the geographies of state failure and state weakness matters for piracy. He argues that
state failure is associated with less sophisticated attacks, whereas state weakness supports
more sophisticated attacks since weaker states provide the facilities necessary for pirating.
Moreover, pirates from failed states are likely to appropriate more liquid assets, whereas
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the ones from weak states tend to appropriate assets with less liquidity. Moreover, failed
states also face a trade-o. If they improve their political and economic systems to escape
from state failure, they might encounter an increased number in high-skilled pirates.
2.2 The Empirical Analysis
2.2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I created the data using several specic underlying datasets. For the full description
of each piracy incident between 1998 and 2007, the main information sources are the
annual reports by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the annual and monthly
reports from International Maritime Organization (IMO). For statistical purposes, the
IMB denes Piracy and Armed Robbery as \An act of boarding or attempting to board
any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the
apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act." This denition
covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or at sea.
Trivial thefts are excluded unless the thieves are armed. This denition has been adopted
by the IMB as the majority attacks against ships take place within the jurisdictions of
States, and piracy, which is dened under United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
(1982) does not address this aspect.
Each incident of piracy and robbery against a seafaring vessel allowed me to create
data on the exact time of the incident (i.e., year and month), its location by type of waters
(port area, territorial water or international waters), the identity of the ship including
its ag of registry, its type of goods carried; its gross registered tonnage (GRT), the type
of violence perpetrated against the crew, ranging from no harm done to deaths, the type
of goods stolen or appropriated, and the number of pirates involved in each incident. I
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also identify whether the attack is actual or attempted.6
Then, based on the location of the attack, I combined the above data with country-
level economic and political measures. Data such as real GDP per capita and its 10-
year growth rate are sourced from the Penn World Tables, Mark 6.3. Annual data
on unemployment rates are obtained from the World Databank. The data on political
and institutional measures primarily come from two dierent sources: Freedom House
world political and civil freedom measures, and the Polity IV project, \Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions". The Freedom House data provide three measures of
political rights, civil liberties and political freedom status. Political rights and civil
liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree
of freedom and seven the lowest.7 The freedom status is classied into three categories:
free, partly free and not free.8 And the Polity IV project provides the institutionalized
democracy score, institutionalized autocracy score and the modied polity score.9
6IMB denes \actual" attack as the incidents where the pirates successfully boarded the target ship
regardless of the consequences to the crews and goods. They also dene \attempted" attack as the
incidents where the pirates failed to board the ship underway and nally gave up the chase. Although
the attack is attempted and pirates cannot rob any goods, it can cause injury to the crews by ring
upon the target from their ships.
7The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties ques-
tions. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process, Political
Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government. The civil liberties questions are grouped
into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights,
Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.
8Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and for Civil Liberties
fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated \Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 \Partly Free," and between 5.5
and 7.0 \Not Free". Beginning with the ratings for 2003, countries whose combined average ratings fall
between 3.0 and 5.0 are \Partly Free" and those between 5.5 and 7.0 are \Not Free".
9The institutionalized democracy score is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One
is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express eective preferences
about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the
exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily
lives and in acts of political participation. The operational indicators of democracy and autocracy are
derived from the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. They are an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The
Polity score is computed by subtracting the institutionalized autocracy score from the institutionalized
democracy score; the resulting unied polity scale ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
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Finally, the data on maritime trade per capita is obtained through Shipping Sta-
tistics Yearbooks from the Institute of shipping and Logistics of Bremen (ISL). The mar-
itime trade per capita is obtained from the loading and unloading cargo trac volume
by selected ports divided by the total population in the region.
There are ve geographic regions covered: Asia, Africa, America, Europe and
Oceania. I calculate the cargo trac volume within each region based only on selected
ports, although those data represent 71 percent of the actual world seaborne trade over
the ten years for which I have data.
Table 2.1 presents the overall trends in piracy attacks over the period between 1998
and 2010. As shown, 2000, 2003, 2009 and 2010 were particular busy years in which the
number of incidents exceeded 400. After the peak in 2003, the number of incidents
dropped and rose again in 2008. The trend shows that from now on the number of
incidents tends to increase. 2009 is the only year in which the number of attempted
attacks is higher than the number of actual attacks.
In Table 2.2, I present the number of piracy incidents by ve main locations in
which piracy incidents commonly occur, Southeast Asia, Far East, Indian Subcontinent,
South America and Africa. In 2005, the number of incidents in Southeast Asia declined
since Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore jointly cracked down on piracy, subsequent to
the designation of the Malacca Strait as a war zone by Lloyd's of London. On the other
hand, the number of incidents in Africa has risen continuously since 2007, especially in
the East Africa on Somalia and Gulf of Aden.
democratic). It is a modied version in order to facilitate the use in time-series analysis by converting
the standardized authority scores to conventional polity scores.
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Table 2.1: Total Piracy Incidents by Year
Year Actual Attacks Attempted Attacks Total
1998 157 35 192
1999 242 58 300
2000 318 151 469
2001 238 97 335
2002 286 84 370
2003 332 113 445
2004 239 90 329
2005 205 71 276
2006 176 63 239
2007 187 76 263
2008 200 93 293
2009 202 204 406
2010 249 196 445
Source: International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 2010
Table 2.2: Actual and Attempted Attacks by Location and Year
Location 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Southeast Asia 158 102 83 70 54 46 70
Far East 15 20 5 10 11 23 44
Indian Subcontinent 32 36 53 30 23 30 28
South America 44 25 29 20 14 37 40
Africa 73 80 61 120 189 266 259
Rest of the World 7 13 8 13 2 4 4
Total 329 276 239 263 293 406 445
Source: International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 2010
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The summary and descriptive statistics of some of the key variables are listed in
Table 2.3. Close to 75 percent of all attacks succeeded over the ten years in the sample.
The Y EARS variable ranges from one to ten in chronological order. It equals one if the
incidents happened in 1998 and ten if they happened in 2007. The frequency of incidents
over time is slightly backloaded although spread fairly evenly, with the average incident
occurring between the fth and sixth years in the decade-long sample (i.e., between 2002
and 2003). For the 2,300 observations for which I have data on the number of pirates
involved in the incident, the average number of pirates employed in each incident is
about six. Most attacks involved one pirate. Of course, these incidents only happened
at ports. But close to ten percent of these attacks involved more than ten pirates, and
43 were reported to take more than twenty. There are ve incidents in which more than
80 pirates involved with a maximum of 200 pirates. Variable GOODS ranges anywhere
from zero to seven on the basis of the economic damage inicted by the pirates: this
variable equals zero if no economic harm was done; GOODS equals one if the pirates
left with some cash; it equals two if they stole spare parts; three, four or ve if they took
storage material, spare parts or equipment, respectively; six if they sought ransom and
seven if they commandeered the vessel. For every one hundred incidents recorded in the
dataset, there were ten incidents in which cash items were stolen; four in which cargo
goods are robbed; three in which the pirates sought ransom; and ve cases where the
vessels were captured.10
For countries where the incidents happened, the real per capita incomes are roughly
$7,600 based on 2005 constant U.S. dollars. The 10-year growth rate of real GDP
per capita is around 22 percent and the unemployment rate is about 8 percent. The
10The denition of variable CASH includes Captains and crews' cash and their personal valuables
and belongings.
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STATUS dummy variable ranges from zero to two. It equals to zero if countries where
the incidents happened have \Not Free" status, one if \Partly Free" status and two if
\Free" status. The mean value of the freedom status is about 1, implying that by average
the countries where the incident happens have partly free status. The WATER variable
ranges from one to three. It equals to one if the incidents happen in the port area, two
if happen in territorial water, and three if they happen in the international water. It
also can be interpreted as the distance from the sea shore. The mean of the variable
WATER is around 1.8. The interpretation is that, on average, the incidents happened
at ports or local waters. For vessels attacked by pirates, on average, the total internal
volume is around 16,800 tons.11 The mean value of maritime trade per capita is 1.15
metric tons.
11Some carriers attacked by pirates are shing boats and other small ships which have very low
tonnages and their values were not recorded by IMO and IMB. Thus, I assume the minimum value of
variable TONNAGE is zero.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Y EARS 3; 371 5:45 2:62 1 10
PIRATES 2; 300 5:95 7:57 1 200
SUCCESS 3; 371 0:744 0:436 0 1
GOODS 3; 371 1:559 1:981 0 7
CASH 3; 371 0:096 0:295 0 1
CARGOGOODS 3; 371 0:036 0:187 0 1
V ESSEL 3; 371 0:045 0:208 0 1
RANSOM 3; 371 0:028 0:165 0 1
RGDPCAP 3; 362 7; 595 39; 804 345:517 653; 046
GROWTH 3; 371 22:04 21:73  65:5087 130:991
UNEMP 3; 371 8:01 4:35 0:691563 50
PRIGHTS 3; 371 4:26 1:50 1 7
STATUS 3; 371 1:08 0:603 0 2
POLITY 3; 371 4:26 4:35  10 10
WATER 3; 371 1:80 0:780 1 3
TONNAGE 3; 371 16; 768:04 21; 602:44 0 218; 593
MTRADECAP 3; 371 1:152 1:121 0:367487 21:1
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Examining the correlation matrix shown in Table 2.4 a, the success rate of attacks
has increased over time but the number of pirates has declined over time. Note that
the success rate of attacks and the number of pirates decline slightly with increases in
per-capita income and the unemployment rate, but they are positively correlated with
the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Also, the number of pirates declines when
citizens have more freedom and political rights and when countries are more democratic.
With the smaller number of pirates, the probability of all types of property appropriation
declines.
Turning to Table 2.4 b, we see that it is harder to successfully attack when the
ships are sailing farther from the land and when the ships are larger. But the success rate
of attacks is positively correlated with the maritime trade per capita and the number of
vessels. It is interesting to observe that the farther the distance from port, the higher
chance of robbing for cash, vessel hijacking and ransom demanding but not for robbing
cargo goods. The reason is that it is easier to successfully operate when the ships are
at the port for loading and unloading the cargo. The number of robberies decreases as
the size of vessel increases. This could be because larger ships imply a higher protection
level.
In Table 2.4 c, incidents with cash and cargo goods robberies have declined slightly
over time, whereas incidents involving vessel hijacking and ransom demanding rose. The
number of pirates is increasing with all four types of robberies.
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Table 2.4: Correlation Matrices
Table 2.4 a:
The Correlation Matrix
SCCS Y EAR PRTS GOOD RGDP GRW UNEM PRGT STAT
SCCS 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Y EAR .0305 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
PRTS .0302 -.019 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
GOOD .4851 .0345 .1723 1 ... ... ... ... ...
RGDP -.061 -.059 -.02 -.024 1 ... ... ... ...
GRW .0792 .1286 .0107 -.032 .188 1 ... ... ...
UNEM -.063 .0979 -.045 -.012 -.055 -.327 1 ... ...
PRGT .1496 .0298 -.023 .0225 -.111 .0004 .1297 1 ...
STAT .1488 .0892 -.037 .0038 -.078 .0974 .0892 .8894 1
POLT .1229 .0176 -.024 .0276 -.148 -.027 .0248 .888 .768
Table 2.4 b:
The Correlation Matrix
SCCS PRTS CASH CRGO RNSM V ESL TONN MTRD WTR
SCCS 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
PRTS .0318 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
CASH .2227 .0473 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
CRGO .1223 .1287 -.057 1 ... ... ... ... ...
RNSM .0964 .0979 -.045 -.0247 1 ... ... ... ...
V ESL .1120 .0975 -.052 -.0287 -.0227 1 ... ... ...
TONN -.141 -.084 -.098 -.0524 -.1010 -.1204 1 ... ...
MTRD .0495 -.02 .0679 -.0149 -.0248 .0048 -.0074 1 ...
WTR -.405 .0622 .1338 -.0576 .1341 .0605 .0055 -.0125 1
Table 2.4 c:
The Correlation Matrix
Y EAR PRTS CASH CRGO V ESL
Y EAR 1 ... ... ... ...
PRTS -0.0178 1 ... ... ...
CASH -0.0146 0.0473 1 ... ...
CRGO -0.0283 0.1287 -0.0572 1 ...
V ESL 0.0200 0.0975 -0.0524 -0.0287 1
RNSM 0.0630 0.0979 -0.0451 -0.0247 -0.0227
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2.2.2 Main Results
Now, to validate the extralegal appropriation model as an application to modern
maritime piracy, I utilize the dataset described above to estimate the number of pirates,
the success rate of attacks, and piracy prots on economic and political explanatory
variables. I also estimate the regional maritime trade volume per capita on piracy-
specic incident variables. The time that the average family allocates to subversive
activity is represented by the data on the number of maritime pirates involved in each
incident. The success rate of attacks is a proxy for subversive technology of attacking
vessels and piracy prots are represented by the success rate of the economic outcomes.
2.2.2.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
I derive the baseline empirical results by estimating the following reduced-form
equation:
OUTCOMEit = +  it + 
it +
2007X
j=1998
 j  Ij
(24)
+
29X
k=1
k  Ik +
8X
m=1
m  Im + "it ,
where OUTCOMEit is an outcome of the piracy act that took place in location i at
time t; it is based on the number of pirates, the success rate of attacks or the nature of
the appropriation involved. In (24),  is a constant and  it represents incident-specic
explanatory variables related to the vessel or geographic location where the incident
occurred. And 
it represents economic or political variables associated with location i
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at time t. Finally, the Ij , Ik and Im represent controls for time xed eects, location
xed eects and carrier xed eects, with the second being based on the 29 locations and
the latter being based on the eight types of carrier in my database where piracy incidents
were reported.12 The 29 locations covered in our dataset account for 3,039 observations
out of the total of 3,362, corresponding roughly to 90 percent of our data points.
In alternative specications, my dependent variable OUTCOMEit is the number
of pirates involved in each incident, PIRATES. Another specication uses SUCCESSit
as a dependent variable. It is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if pirates
succeed in boarding the vessel and zero is the attack is attempted which means the
pirates could not successfully board the vessel. Alternatively, my dependent variable
OUTCOMEit is also one of four measures of economic outcomes: whether or not the
pirates stole cash from the crew or the vessel, CASHit; they used the crew for ransom
demands, RANSOMit; they succeeded in capturing the vessel, V ESSELit; or they stole
cargo goods for sale; CARGOGOODSit. All of dependent variables are dummies except
PIRATES.
In terms of the incident-specic economic or political explanatory variables in the
matrix 
it, there are per capita real GDP, its growth rate and unemployment levels
at time t in location i, RGDPCAPit; GROWTHit and UNEMPit, respectively. This
matrix also includes measures on political rights, political freedom status and the polity
score, labeled as PRIGHTSit, STATUSit and POLITYit, respectively.
13 The matrix
12On this basis, I end up with ten year xed eects for 1998 through 2007; eight carrier xed eects for
liquid gas tankers, chemical tankers, oil tankers, container ships, bulk carriers, general cargo ships, shing
vessels and others; and 30 location xed eects that cover Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam, the
Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Singapore Strait, the Red Sea, and nally,
\others" for locations that are not covered by these 29 locations.
13To facilitate interpreting the results in the empirical analysis, I generated a new variable representing
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of incident-specic vessel and geographic explanatory variables,  it, includes the month
and year of the incident, its geographic location, the type of water where the incident
happens (WATER) as well as the gross registered tonnage (TONNAGE), ag, type of
vessel and the maritime trade volume per capita in the region where the incident occurs
(MTRADECAP ).14
In Tables 2.5 through 2.10, I report the baseline, reduced-form estimates. Table
2.5 includes the economic and political factors and outcome related to the number of
pirates and the next table turn to the success rate of attacks. Table 2.7 through 2.10
then turn to an assessment of more economic-based outcomes. From Table 2.5 to Table
2.10, the regressions in column (1) are the simplest specication, with only key economic
and politico-institutional measures employed with the xed eects on attack locations
and years. The second regression then adds xed eects based on the attacked carriers.
The third column adds WATER as a basic right-hand side control. The next regression
then adds TONNAGE of the vessels and MTRADECAP as additional controls. And
the nal column in table 2.6 through 2.10 includes the number of pirates, PIRATES,
as an additional control variable.
In terms of the incident-related or geographic variables that are controlled for in
all regressions in Table 2.5, I include the TONNAGE of the vessels because the number
of pirates required for an attack might be associated with the size of the vessel. Since the
the inverse of the index value such that the higher score implies the higher degree of political rights
freedom.
14I have dummies for the ags of 20 countries under which the vessels attacked sailed. The incidents
invloving ships under these country ags account for more than 75 percent of the data. The countries for
which I have ag dummies include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, India, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Saint
Vincent, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I also have eight carrier-type
dummies: Liquid gas tankers, Chemical tankers, Oil tankers, Container ships, Bulk carriers, General
cargo ships, Fishing boats and Others (Passenger ferries, Tugs, Barges, Yachts and Supply ships).
43
variableWATER could be interpreted as the distance from the sea shore, the position of
the attack could aect the amount of pirates employed when attacking the vessel. Hence,
I includeWATER as a basic right-hand side control. I include a measure of the volume of
maritime trade per capita of the region where the attack occurred, MTRADECAP , on
the idea that maritime trade volumes could, independently, aect the number of pirates
necessary for attacking in a particular region. MTRADECAP can also be interpreted
as the sum of the demand and supply for goods and services transported by sea in the
region.
The set of our basic economic variables as well as those for political stability and
institutional controls are self-explanatory. In any case, the main economic variables are
real income per capita, RGDPCAP , economic growth, GROWTH, and the unemploy-
ment rate, UNEMP . And the main controls for political stability and institutional
quality are the political rights index, PRIGHTS, the freedom status, STATUS, and
the polity score, POLITY .
In the rst column of Table 2.5, I regress the number of pirates, PIRATES, on
the simplest set of only economic and political variables and xed eects for location and
year. As shown, the number of pirates depends negatively on per-capita income and the
freedom status of the country where the incident took place. Adding xed eects for the
vessels attacked reveals that GDP per capita and freedom status are still statistically
signicant determinants on the number of pirates. In column (3), I add WATER as an
additional control which is statistically signicant. This implies that more pirates were
needed when they attacked ships farther from shore. Moreover, the unemployment rate
becomes statistically signicant with the positive sign. The number of pirates is higher
when the unemployment rate is rising. In the nal column, I present the estimate with
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the full set of controls and xed eects plus the gross registered tonnage, TONNAGE
and maritime trade per capita, MTRADECAP , as additional controls. The earlier set
of results remain the same while TONNAGE is statistically signicant, implying that
less pirates were needed when they attacked larger ships. As stated in Proposition 1 in
Chapter 1, for a given level of piracy eort, larger ships mean fewer resources devoted
to piracy attacks.
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Table 2.5: Reduced-Form Estimates with The Number of Pirates as Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
RGDPCAP -3.97e-06** -3.89e-06** -3.98e-06** -4.06e-06*
(1.71e-06) (1.79e-06) (1.93e-06) (2.02e-06)
GROWTH -0.00120 0.00236 0.000193 0.000172
(0.00660) (0.00737) (0.00689) (0.00700)
UNEMP 0.0881 0.0983 0.107* 0.107*
(0.0587) (0.0617) (0.0614) (0.0619)
PRIGHTS 0.635 0.555 0.470 0.547
(0.447) (0.413) (0.406) (0.408)
STATUS -1.998*** -1.868*** -1.694*** -1.721***
(0.646) (0.613) (0.590) (0.568)
POLITY -0.0916 -0.101 -0.0972 -0.109
(0.0611) (0.0614) (0.0630) (0.0672)
WATER 0.763* 0.779*
(0.445) (0.439)
TONNAGE -1.43e-05**
(5.58e-06)
MTRADECAP -0.0948
(0.0669)
LOCATION FE Y Y Y Y
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y
CARRIER FE N Y Y Y
Observations 2,294 2,294 2,294 2,294
R-squared 0.038 0.052 0.055 0.056
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In Table 2.6, the dependent variable is the success rate of attacks by pirates,
SUCCESS. Note that the success rate of attacks produces binary outcomes. Thereby,
it would be more appropriate to estimate by using the Probit technique. With the
most parsimonious regression in column (1), only real income per capita matters. Real
income per capita produces the expected negative sign. Higher per capita incomes are
associated with the lower probability of the successful attack. The results remain the
same in column (2) when I add the xed eect for carriers. When the WATER is
added to column (3), it becomes statistically signicant with the negative sign. The
probability that pirates successfully attack is higher when they target the ships closer
to land. As the dataset suggests, the probability of successful attacks at the port is
about 88% while the probability of success in international waters is around 46%. In
column (4), when TONNAGE and MTRADECAP are added, only TONNAGE is
statistically signicant with the expected sign. TONNAGE produces a negative sign;
the larger the ship, the lower probability of a successful attack. In the last column when
the number of pirates is added into the specication, the result is the same as in column
(4) whereas PIRATES is not statistically signicant.
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Table 2.6: Reduced-Form Estimates with Probit Regressions with The Success
Rate of Attacks as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RGDPCAP -1.22e-06*** -9.86e-07*** -6.72e-07** -7.45e-07** -4.52e-07*
(1.86e-07) (2.25e-07) (3.00e-07) (3.16e-07) (2.68e-07)
GROWTH -0.00104 -0.000651 6.92e-05 0.000140 -0.00198
(0.00118) (0.00121) (0.00143) (0.00142) (0.00137)
UNEMP -0.000262 0.00359 -0.00299 -0.00211 -0.000952
(0.00546) (0.00609) (0.00517) (0.00538) (0.00641)
PRIGHTS -0.00521 -0.0129 0.0394 0.0498 0.124
(0.0579) (0.0680) (0.0724) (0.0786) (0.0930)
STATUS 0.0657 0.0709 0.00344 0.00730 -0.0808
(0.109) (0.110) (0.121) (0.122) (0.145)
POLITY -0.00776 -0.00991 -0.0172 -0.0203 -0.0261
(0.0146) (0.0173) (0.0191) (0.0209) (0.0194)
WATER -0.595*** -0.593*** -0.645***
(0.0727) (0.0724) (0.0717)
TONNAGE -6.50e-06*** -8.61e-06***
(2.25e-06) (2.46e-06)
MTRADECAP -0.00574 0.0112
(0.00877) (0.00952)
PIRATES 0.0123
(0.00946)
LOCATION FE Y Y Y Y Y
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y
CARRIER FE N Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,363 3,363 3,363 3,363 2,294
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Since the success rate of attacks solely does not imply success in appropriation, I,
then, consider economic outcomes as dependent variables. Because the level of piratical
prots comes from the number of appropriation incidents, I test the model by using
economic outcomes as a proxy of prots. Table 2.7 through 2.10 present four measures
of common economic outcomes pirates appropriated: whether or not the pirates stole
cash, cargo goods, hijack vessel and demand ransom. Again, since the types of properties
taken by pirates produce binary outcomes, I run the baseline, reduced-form regressions
with the Probit approach.
In Table 2.7, I turn to cash robberies as outcomes and nd that RGDPCAP ,
UNEMP and STATUS are statistically signicant in all columns. When levels of in-
come per capita and the vessels' total volume were higher, cash robberies did decline
signicantly. When the political freedom status of the countries where the incidents
happen are higher, incidents involving cash robbery signicantly dropped. PRIGHTS
is signicant only in column (1), (2) and (3). WATER is signicant only in column (3)
and (4). PIRATES is also positively signicant. Cash robberies are higher when the
incidents happen farther from the land and when more pirates are involved. Paradox-
ically, however, I also nd that a higher unemployment rate was also associated with
fewer piracy incidents with cash robberies. This might be because pirates shift toward
other targets. TONNAGE and MTRADECAP are statistically signicant.
In Table 2.8, I use the cargo goods robbery as a dependent variable. For column
(1), (2) and (3), the results are the same in which the economic growth rate and political
and civil freedom status are signicant. Illogically, cargo goods robbery is increasing in
countries with more political and civil freedom. When TONNAGE andMTRADECAP
are included in column (4), those variables become signicant with the negative sign.
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Larger vessels and higher maritime trade volume result in fewer cargo goods robberies.
In the last column, when adding the number of pirates into the equation, PIRATES is
signicant with a positive sign. Income per capita and unemployment rate now become
signicant with the positive signs. Irrationally, cargo goods robbery is increasing with
real income per capita. TONNAGE is no longer signicant.
I explore the determinants of vessels captured by pirates in Table 2.9. None of the
variables is signicant in the rst column. When the carrier xed eect is included in
the second column, the growth rate of real income is signicant. UNEMP , STATUS,
TONNAGE and PIRATES become signicant in the last column. But the economic
growth rate is no longer signicant. The number of vessel hijackings is decreasing in the
countries with higher political and civil freedom status and in the regions with higher
trade volumes by water.
Finally, Table 2.10 presents the impact of my explanatory variables on the extent to
which pirates seek ransom. As seen, the income level is signicant in the last column only.
But it produces a positive sign which implies that higher real income is associated with
the higher number of incidents involved with the ransom demand. Strangely, STATUS
is also signicant with the positive sign in all columns. The strength of democracy, the
distance from the land, the size of the vessel, the volume of maritime trade per capita
and the number of pirates involved also matter for the demand for ransom.
It is interesting to note that the sign of MTRADECAP is positive only when
the economic outcome is cash. In the region with the higher regional trade volume
by water per capita, pirates tend to appropriate cash rather than other types of booty.
PIRATES is positively signicant and TONNAGE is negatively signicant in all types
of good appropriated.
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Table 2.7: Reduced-Form Estimates with Probit Regressions with Cash Robbery
as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RGDPCAP -2.22e-06* -2.22e-06** -2.36e-06** -2.44e-06** -2.88e-06**
(1.17e-06) (1.11e-06) (1.02e-06) (1.07e-06) (1.14e-06)
GROWTH -0.000998 -0.000584 -0.000811 -0.000505 -0.00253
(0.00493) (0.00484) (0.00492) (0.00506) (0.00433)
UNEMP -0.0262*** -0.0257*** -0.0220*** -0.0313*** -0.0266***
(0.00701) (0.00704) (0.00640) (0.00829) (0.00808)
PRIGHTS 0.228** 0.244** 0.218* 0.185 0.0561
(0.108) (0.110) (0.114) (0.116) (0.142)
STATUS -0.412** -0.415** -0.350* -0.369* -0.370*
(0.190) (0.196) (0.185) (0.194) (0.225)
POLITY -0.0148 -0.0208 -0.0195 -0.0143 0.0134
(0.0194) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0188) (0.0225)
WATER 0.335* 0.332* 0.370
(0.197) (0.198) (0.234)
TONNAGE -7.11e-06*** -1.23e-05**
(1.77e-06) (4.85e-06)
MTRADECAP 0.0765*** 0.0716***
(0.00876) (0.0129)
PIRATES 0.0181**
(0.00756)
LOCATION FE Y Y Y Y Y
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y
CARRIER FE N Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,959 2,959 2,959 2,959 1,991
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Reduced-Form Estimates with Probit Regressions with Cargo Goods
Robbery as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RGDPCAP -1.21e-06 -1.18e-06 -1.10e-06 -7.19e-07 3.02e-06***
(7.89e-07) (9.04e-07) (9.54e-07) (9.55e-07) (1.12e-06)
GROWTH -0.00697* -0.00910** -0.00883** -0.00879** -0.0161**
(0.00401) (0.00410) (0.00386) (0.00366) (0.00712)
UNEMP 0.000809 -0.00284 -0.00301 0.00324 0.0386***
(0.0120) (0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0125)
PRIGHTS -0.136 -0.123 -0.123 -0.0902 -0.169
(0.136) (0.120) (0.122) (0.144) (0.179)
STATUS 0.477*** 0.415*** 0.414*** 0.441*** 0.473
(0.120) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.296)
POLITY -0.00850 -0.0119 -0.0112 -0.0151 0.0238
(0.0393) (0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0422) (0.0584)
WATER -0.101 -0.0786 -0.127
(0.168) (0.159) (0.148)
TONNAGE -1.29e-05* -1.45e-05
(7.84e-06) (1.24e-05)
MTRADECAP -0.287** -0.415***
(0.114) (0.144)
PIRATES 0.0181***
(0.00407)
LOCATION FE Y Y Y Y Y
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y
CARRIER FE N Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 1,374
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
52
Table 2.9: Reduced-Form Estimates with Probit Regressions with Vessel Hijack-
ing as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RGDPCAP -3.75e-07 3.30e-07 2.91e-07 2.59e-07 -2.05e-06
(1.25e-06) (1.41e-06) (1.41e-06) (1.41e-06) (1.72e-06)
GROWTH 0.00225 0.00531** 0.00522** 0.00582** 0.00628
(0.00188) (0.00212) (0.00208) (0.00228) (0.00697)
UNEMP -0.00486 0.00557 0.00579 0.0138 0.0320**
(0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0149) (0.0148)
PRIGHTS 0.116 0.0755 0.0749 0.141 0.180
(0.132) (0.147) (0.147) (0.170) (0.175)
STATUS -0.180 -0.166 -0.163 -0.201 -0.654**
(0.149) (0.160) (0.162) (0.170) (0.310)
POLITY -0.0157 -0.0163 -0.0171 -0.0266 0.0206
(0.0242) (0.0325) (0.0317) (0.0357) (0.0402)
WATER 0.0414 0.0305 -0.103
(0.0785) (0.0643) (0.0948)
TONNAGE -1.82e-05 -8.03e-05*
(1.73e-05) (4.32e-05)
MTRADECAP -0.0885*** -0.0587**
(0.0188) (0.0276)
PIRATES 0.0147***
(0.00358)
LOCATION FE Y Y Y Y Y
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y
CARRIER FE N Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,813 2,813 2,813 2,813 1,146
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Reduced-Form Estimates with Probit Regressions with Ransom De-
mand as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RGDPCAP -3.72e-08 1.17e-07 -3.63e-07 -2.60e-07 3.35e-06**
(5.69e-07) (6.56e-07) (6.50e-07) (5.38e-07) (1.46e-06)
GROWTH 0.00103 0.000706 -0.000806 -0.00167 -0.00144
(0.00498) (0.00445) (0.00480) (0.00499) (0.0111)
UNEMP 0.0134 0.0253* 0.0251* 0.0304* -0.0253
(0.0170) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0172) (0.0411)
PRIGHTS -0.186** -0.178 -0.225* -0.0990 -0.111
(0.0949) (0.110) (0.122) (0.132) (0.326)
STATUS 0.850*** 0.925*** 1.109*** 1.173*** 2.657***
(0.268) (0.298) (0.355) (0.366) (0.478)
POLITY -0.0411 -0.0713* -0.0821* -0.108** -0.179***
(0.0280) (0.0369) (0.0429) (0.0525) (0.0691)
WATER 0.406*** 0.455*** 0.492***
(0.0900) (0.0905) (0.127)
TONNAGE -6.01e-05*** -6.63e-05***
(1.27e-05) (1.05e-05)
MTRADECAP -0.436* -0.241
(0.252) (0.371)
PIRATES 0.0172*
(0.00959)
LOCATION FE Y Y Y Y Y
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y
CARRIER FE N Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,475 2,286 2,286 2,286 1,285
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Now, I inspect the eects of maritime piracy incidents on regional maritime trade
volume. I assume that the piracy incidents and the incentive to trade are not con-
temporaneous. The decision to trade by water decreases in the face of previous piracy
incidents. To see how past piracy incidents impact maritime trac volume in the current
period, I create seven lagged variables on piracy-related factors; LAG SUCCESSit 1,
the probability of successful attack in period t-1, LAG INCIDENTSit 1, the total
number of piracy incidents in period t-1, LAG AV GPIRATESit 1, the average number
of pirates involved in each incident in period t-1, LAG GOODSit 1, the level of eco-
nomic damage inicted by pirates in period t-1, LAG SHIP TRADEit 1, the number
of piracy incidents which happen to the vessels carrying traded goods in period t-115,
LAG PORTit 1, the number of piracy incidents occurred at the port area in period t-1,
LAG CREWHARMit 1, the number of piracy incidents in which the crews were subject
to physical harm in period t-1.16
Observing the correlation matrix shown in Table 2.11, the maritime trade volume
per capita in the current period is positively correlated with the probability of successful
attack in the last period, the average number of pirates involved in each incident in the
last period, the level of economic damage inicted by pirates in the past period, and
the number of piracy incidents in which the crews were subject to physical harm in the
last period. Given the higher total number of piracy incidents in the last period, the
higher number of piracy incidents that happen to the vessels carry traded goods in the
last period and the higher number of piracy incidents that occur at the port area in
the last period, the volume of maritime trade per capita of the region in the current
15Vessels carrying traded goods consist of six types of carriers: liquid gas tankers, chemical tankers,
oil tankers, container ships, bulk carriers and general cargo ships.
16This is a dummy variable that attains the value of one if the pirates either threatened, physically
assualted, kidnapped or killed at least one vessel crew, and is zero otherwise.
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period declines. The probability of the successful attack is positively correlated with
the number of incidents, the average number of pirates involved in each incident, the
level of economic damage inicted, the number of incidents that happen to the vessels
containing traded goods, the number of piracy incidents that occur at the port area and
the number of piracy incidents where the crews were subject to physical harm.
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Table 2.11: Correlation Matrix on lagged piracy-related variables and Regional
Maritime Trade per Capita
MTPC L SCS L INC L AV PRT L GDS L SHIP L PRT
MTRADECAP 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
L SUCCESS 0.1188 1 ... ... ... ... ...
L INCIDENTS -0.2743 0.151 1 ... ... ... ...
L AV GPIRATE 0.0152 0.3265 -0.1745 1 ... ... ...
L GOODS 0.0111 0.5613 -0.0509 0.1971 1 ... ...
L SHIPTRADE -0.4137 0.0313 0.2523 -0.0196 -0.4865 1 ...
L PORT -0.2548 0.5004 0.2637 0.0932 0.1213 0.2307 1
L CREWHARM 0.2751 0.7448 -0.1339 0.3401 0.5364 -0.1598 0.1991
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Next, I report the baseline, reduced-form estimates with the region maritime trade
per capita, MTRADECAPit, as a dependent variable. In the rst column of Table
2.12, I regress MTRADECAP on (1) LAG SUCCESS, (2) LAG INCIDENTS, (3)
LAG AV GPIRATES, (4) the simplest set of six economic and political variables, which
are RGDPCAP , GROWTH, UNEMP , PRIGHTS, STATUS and POLITY , and (5)
the gross registered tonnage, TONNAGE. As shown, the regional maritime trade vol-
ume depends negatively on the regional economic growth and the tonnage but positively
on the political rights level. But none of the lagged variables on piracy-specic explana-
tory variables is signicant. In column (2), I add LAG GOODS as an additional control
but it is not signicant.
In column (3), I added LAG SHIP TRADE into the specication. Now variables
LAG AV GPIRATES, LAG GOODS, LAG SHIP TRADE and STATUS are neg-
atively signicant but economic growth is no longer signicant. Once LAG PORT is
introduced in column (4), we see that in the past period the average number of pirates
involved in each incident, the economic damage level caused by pirates, the incidents
that happen to the vessels carrying traded goods and the incidents that happen at the
port area negatively and signicantly inuence the region maritime trade volume in the
current period. In the last column, I add LAG CREWHARM as an additional control
but it is not signicant. The result is the same as in column (4).
In sum, I nd evidence that the existence of modern-day piracy aects the maritime
trade. Piracy incident-related factors that aect the regional maritime trade per capita
are the number of pirates involved, the level of economic damage, the type of vessels and
the position of the attack.
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Table 2.12: Reduced-Form Estimates with the Region Maritime Trade per Capita
as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
L SUCCESS -4.044 -3.304 2.822 4.522 6.126
(2.761) (3.121) (3.426) (3.372) (4.255)
L INCIDENTS 0.000307 -0.00163 -0.00955 -0.00920 -0.00969
(0.00725) (0.00819) (0.00773) (0.00737) (0.00748)
L AV GPIRATES -3.054 -3.785 -7.378** -7.243** -7.173**
(2.599) (2.966) (2.888) (2.752) (2.783)
L GOODS -0.375 -2.682** -2.968*** -2.861***
(0.705) (0.983) (0.947) (0.973)
L SHIP TRADE -11.17*** -11.18*** -11.22***
(3.671) (3.498) (3.535)
L PORT -4.428* -4.280*
(2.201) (2.236)
L CREWHARM -2.428
(3.856)
RGDPCAP -0.000131 -0.000102 0.000113 4.29e-05 6.56e-05
(0.000131) (0.000144) (0.000146) (0.000143) (0.000149)
GROWTH -0.116** -0.110** -0.0546 -0.0441 -0.0394
(0.0450) (0.0468) (0.0454) (0.0435) (0.0446)
UNEMP -0.0248 -0.0299 -0.0340 -0.0567 -0.0181
(0.148) (0.150) (0.133) (0.127) (0.143)
PRIGHTS 5.453** 5.798** 6.056*** 5.465*** 5.469***
(2.114) (2.234) (1.987) (1.916) (1.936)
STATUS -4.495 -5.004 -7.451* -7.124* -7.121*
(4.024) (4.180) (3.801) (3.625) (3.663)
POLITY -0.658 -0.703 -0.599 -0.219 -0.296
(0.505) (0.518) (0.461) (0.478) (0.499)
TONNAGE -0.000261*** -0.000254** -0.000224** -0.000194** -0.000218**
(9.52e-05) (9.71e-05) (8.68e-05) (8.40e-05) (9.33e-05)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.684 0.687 0.761 0.790 0.793
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.2.2.2 Alternative Specications & Robustness
Although I show the reduced-form estimates with the Probit regression when the
dependent variables are dummies, I performed the reduced-form linear regressions to test
the robustness of qualitative results. I perform the analogs of the regressions shown in
the nal columns of Tables 2.6 through 2.10. The results show that qualitative results
are very similar to the ones reported in Table 2.6 through 2.10.17
Next, one problem with estimating the incidents of appropriation by using the
reduced-form approach comes from the fact that some explanatory variables are endoge-
nous; TONNAGE; WATER; PIRATES. They are choice variables that the pirates
have full control over because they can decide on how many pirates are hired, which
ships to attack and where to attack them. Thus, I did two-stage least square estimates
(2SLS) in which I construct an instrument for these endogenous variables. My instru-
ment choice is a set of (twelve) dummies for month of attack. The idea is that because
weather conditions are not only highly seasonal but also signicantly inuence whether
or not attacks in the open seas or harbors would succeed with higher likelihood. The
baseline 2SLS empirical results were estimated and they did not alter in any qualitative
manner.
Although I report a subset of the analyses conducted, I experimented with a variety
of alternative specications to test the robustness of my qualitative results. For example,
besides the three institutional and polity measures I have included in the tables above,
I also have three other related measures such as the civil liberty index, the democracy
and autocracy indices of countries in which attacks occurred. Utilizing these variables
in conjunction with or in lieu of PRIGHTS, STATUS and POLITY in a variety of
17All results discussed but not shown are available upon request.
60
alternative regressions, the key results did not alter in any meaningful way, although
the measures I reported on the above generally produced the most signicant eects on
outcomes and the signs of their coecients were not always consistent with predictions.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter attempts to test the validity of the extralegal appropriation and pro-
duction model as an application to modern maritime piracy. Based on the theoretical
framework presented in Chapter 1, the extralegal activities are aected by economic in-
centives. Accordingly, the rise of modern-era maritime piracy is inversely related to the
economic conditions of regions from which modern pirates emerge.
In order to test the empirical relevance of economic factors for piracy, I rely on a
dataset that includes worldwide 3,362 modern-day piracy incidents that occurred from
1998 to 2007. The data provide detailed information on the location, timing and the
type of each attack, whether it is actual or attempted, the characteristics of the target
vessel as well as the material damage and violence inicted upon the crew and the
properties. Based on the country where the incident take place, data on macroeconomic
and aggregate measures of per-capita incomes, rates of economic growth, unemployment
and political quality are included.
I have emphasized three main ndings: First, the empirical results strongly support
the proposed theoretical model as economic factors play a signicant role in explaining
the modern maritime piracy behavior. For instance, higher real per-capita incomes and
lower unemployment rates are likely to reduce the number of pirates involved in each
incident. Seaborne trade volume is increasing in the number of pirates and the success
rate of attacks. Second, political institutions are also important explaining this phenom-
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enon although they are not as much nor consistent as economic factors. For example,
the incidents that occur in the countries with greater levels of political and civil freedom
tend to have fewer pirates involved in each incident, and more democratic countries tend
to better protect the sea which reduces the success rate of attacks. More democratic
countries have fewer cases in which pirates board the ship and demand ransom. Finally,
I found that there are also other factors that explain maritime piracy incidents such
as the ships' size, the distance between the incident position and the shore, the total
merchant eet in each year and the cargo trac volume by marine transportation. For
example, attacking larger ships requires that more pirates are involved in order to suc-
ceed. Pirates tend to successfully kidnap the crews and ask for ransoms in the regions
with higher maritime trade volume per capita.
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CHAPTER 3
Learning Piracy on the High Seas
3.1 Introduction
It was not long ago that high-seas piracy was mostly the stu of legends, maritime
history, and adventure novels. Starting in the mid-1990s, however, piracy began making
a comeback, steadily turning into an epidemic that, today, seriously aicts sea trac,
trade and commerce.
Consider: The data on international maritime piracy is maintained by the Piracy
Reporting Center of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) but, as a sign of the
increasing prevalence and relevance of modern maritime piracy in the 1990s, systematic
incidents data is available starting only in 1995. This data shows that the frequency of
reported incidents rose 270 percent within less than a decade, rising from 126 cases of
maritime piracy in 1995 to 465 in 2003. In fact, most of that increase was recorded within
a shorter span of two years between 1998 and 2000, when the number of piracy incidents
went from 191 cases to 483, reecting an increase of 183 percent. Commensurate with
this rise, of course, are the human and material tolls of piracy. In 1998, there were 30
cases in which the crew were physically assaulted; 24 incidents in which hostages were
taken; ten cases with crew deaths and nine ship seizures. Within ve years, 40 incidents
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involved physical assault; 71 cases involved hostage-taking; nine incidents of crew death;
and 33 cases in which the vessels were surrendered to pirates.
Gathmann and Hillmann (2009) claim that the conventional narrative attributes
the fall of ancient piracy to a combination of more sophisticated and evasive merchant
ships, the naval presence of colonial powers and to international regulations.18 The
reemergence of maritime piracy in the modern era is, then, often explained as a corol-
lary, such as the contemporary prevalence of failed or weak states in East Africa, lax
international maritime legislation as well as pirate-friendly technological advances in
communications and seafaring technologies. In this, the economic opportunity costs of
piracy, by way of economically retarded and weakening states, are also often highlighted
as potentially important culprits.
In this paper, we study the determinants of modern-era piracy, in particular, its
success and evolution over time. Our work is based on a new dataset that includes
3,362 modern-day piracy incidents that occurred around the world between 1998 and
2007. The data encompasses detailed information on the location, timing and success
of each attack, as well as the material damage and violence inicted upon the crew and
the cargo. We combine these incident-based data with macroeconomic and aggregate
measures of per-capita incomes, rates of economic growth and the institutional quality
of countries whose territorial waters either witnessed these piracy incidents or were in
closest proximity.
In the end, we come away with three important empirical ndings. First, economic
factors do indeed play an important role in the sustenance of modern maritime piracy:
18Gathmann and Hillmann (2009) study the decline of another form of ancient piracy. They argue
that the decline of British privateering in the eighteenth century was based on the expansion of overseas
trade and the ensuing decline in the protability of commerce raiding.
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higher per-capita incomes dampen both the physical violence and material damage of
attacks. For example, higher par-capita incomes and rates of employment are associated
with fewer successful attacks that culminated with vessel seizures and ransom demands,
while they are related more frequently with cases in which the crews go unharmed.
Second, we detect that political institutions and legal enforcement are also important,
although not as much nor consistently as economic factors. In particular, we nd that
incidents that occur in the territorial waters of countries with more eective polities and
authoritarian governments tend to involve fewer cases in which pirates launch successful
raids, rob the crew or the ship of their cash, or seize the vessel. And conversely, such
polities and governments are associated with more incidents in which the crews escape
safely.
Above all, however, we document signicant learning-by-doing and skill accumu-
lation among the pirates that have helped modern piracy evolve into a more potent
threat. A history of successful piracy attacks locally improves the odds of success in
piracy, making it more likely that pirates target larger vessels in closer proximity to
land. To a weaker extent, it even inuences the extent to which pirates are able to inict
violence on the crew and seize the ship. Moreover, these learning-by-doing eects are
robust to the inclusion of a host of other controls, location, region and year xed eects
as well as some proxies for capital use, such as vessels, equipment and spare parts stolen
in previous raids, and labor input, given by the number of pirates involved in attacks.
There are not many papers in the economics literature that focus on maritime
piracy, and empirical work on the topic is scant. But existing studies typically show that
institutions and state capacity matter, although there is some debate on whether those
determinants exert a non-monotonic inuence. According to Piazza (2008), for instance,
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state failure is more conducive to piracy than higher state capacity. But there are also
those, such as Menkhaus (2004), who instead argue that the economic and geographic
infrastructure that weak states can sustain | but failed states cannot | complement acts
of piracy. Hastings (2009) reconciles these ndings by dierentiating acts of maritime
piracy by the sophistication level required for dierent kinds of booty: Pirates from
failed states commit more time-intensive crimes, such as kidnapping for ransom, because
of a lack of legal enforcement and markets in which economically valuable booty can be
liquidated. In contrast, pirates who hail from weak states tend to target goods, cargo
and vessels that can be seized and sold in markets that are suciently deep, liquid and
anonymous.19
Regarding the role of economic factors in the reemergence of piracy, there is much
media coverage but not enough quantitative empirical analyses. Nonetheless, a consen-
sus seems to have converged on the hypothesis that adverse economic conditions help to
sustain 21st-century piracy.20 Any such claims that the economic conditions matter for
modern-day piracy are, at least implicitly, based on the political economy literature on
production and extralegal appropriation. The hypothesis that extralegal appropriation
and violent conict over the ownership of resources should be modeled as an alternative
to economic production was originally articulated by Haavelmo (1954) and further de-
veloped by follow-up papers such as Hirshleifer (1991), Grossman (1994), Grossman and
Kim (1995), Grossman and Iyigun (1995, 1997), Skaperdas (1992, 2005), Bates et al.
19Two other papers by Leeson (2007) and Ambrus and Chaney (2010) focus on ancient maritime
piracy. Leeson's main emphasis is on the informal social and institutional arrangements pirates of the
yore mustered in order to operate with some degree of organization and eciency. Ambrus and Chaney
explore the extent to which dynamic bargaining principles applied in Spanish dealings with Barbary
Corsairs' ransom demands between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
20\Modern High Seas Piracy" by Countrman and McDaniels Law Oces (2000, 2005), at
http://www.cargolaw.com/presentations pirates.html#Introduction.
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(2002), and Hafer (2006). Accordingly, the opportunity cost of modern maritime piracy
involves legal and gainful labor employment. On that basis, poor economic opportunities
are the prime driver of modern-day piracy, especially as they pertain to the incidents o
the eastern coasts of Africa. As our empirical ndings indicate, there is some consistent
evidence that the level of per-capita incomes and employment are inversely related to
the success of piracy attacks and they have explanatory power in the motives for seeking
economically-valuable booty.
Beyond that, however, our results have special pertinence, because modern-era
piracy is a capital- and skill-intensive endeavour that is subject to potential renements
in technique, a learning curve and job-specic skills acquisition. As Hastings (2009)
articulates, modern incidents of piracy require logistical planning and support not only
on the front end, which denes the point up to the attack and the boarding of vessels,
but also the back end too, which covers the period from the attack to culmination with
a potential liquidation of the booty.
On the front end, skills and capital are required in order to identify, track and
close in on targets. On the back end, infrastructure, networks and connections are
needed to sell or repurpose the ships and their cargo. Or, in the case of hostages, to set
up `accommodations' during the often lengthy and risky phase of ransom negotiations,21
our ndings show that modern-era piracy has evolved over time on the basis of accu-
mulated piracy experience locally to yield not only higher success rates, but also more
economically-valuable booty and higher risk to the crew. In fact, we nd that the
21Some pirate outts are organized enough that they have military command-and-control structures
and the pirates wear uniforms. Attacks have been recorded as much as 450 km. from the coastlines,
made possible in part by the pirates use of mother and satellite ships as well as GPS trackers. There are
also cases in which the pirates are known to have inserted moles on board targeted vessels. For more
details, see Hastings (2009).
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learning-by-doing eects in modern maritime piracy are important enough to, at least
partially, oset the dampening role of better economic and political conditions.
There is a sizeable literature on the role of learning-by-doing on worker and rm
productivity, industrial organization as well as economic growth. Arrow (1962), Lucas
(1988), Stokey (1988), Parente (1994), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Iyigun (2006) and
Iyigun and Owen (2006) are among those who hypothesize that on-the-job learning and
knowledge spillovers are important for endogenous economic growth. More recently,
Thompson has taken some empirical exception to the productivity impact of worker
learning and experience. Spence (1981), Cabral and Riordan (1994), and Benkard (2004)
show the inuence of learning by doing on industrial organization by illustrating how rm
experience can lead to increases in industry concentration through the emergence of a low-
cost dominant rm. There is also a strand which documents the existence of relationship-
specic learning. For instance, Kellogg (2009) argues that relation-specicity matters by
identifying that the joint productivity of an oil production company and its drilling
contractor is enhanced signicantly as they accumulate experience working together.
3.2 The Empirical Analysis
3.2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We created our dataset using several specic underlying sources of information.
For the full description of each piracy incident between 1998 and 2007, we relied on the
annual reports by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the annual and monthly
reports of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For each attempted incident
of piracy and robbery against a seafaring vessel, these publications provided us data on
the exact time of the incident (year, month, day and hour); its location by territorial
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waters (whether or not the attack was attempted in international waters); the identity
of the ship including its ag of registry; its gross registered tonnage (TONNAGE); the
type of violence perpetrated against the crew (ranging from no harm done to deaths);
the types of goods stolen or appropriated; and the number of pirates involved.
Based on the location of the attack, we then augmented the above data with
country-specic economic and political measures. Data such as real GDP per capita
and its growth rate are cited from the Penn World Tables, Mark 6.3. Annual data
on unemployment rates are obtained from the World Databank. The data on political
and institutional measures primarily come from two dierent sources: Freedom House
world political and civil freedom measures, and the Polity IV project, \Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions." The Freedom House data provide us three measures
of political rights and freedoms.22 Polity IV, on the other hand, supplies the institu-
tionalized democracy score, institutionalized autocracy score and the modied polity
score.23
Our data on maritime trade per capita are from the Shipping Statistics Yearbooks
by the Institute of Shipping and Logistics of Bremen (ISL). They are based on the loading
and unloading cargo trac volume by selected ports divided by the total population in
22Political rights are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of
freedom and seven the lowest.
23The institutionalized democracy score is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements: The
rst one is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express eective pref-
erences about alternative policies and leaders. The second element is the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. The third component then is the guarantee of
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.
The operational indicators of democracy and autocracy are derived from the competitiveness of po-
litical participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the
chief executive. All of these indices are based on an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The Polity
score is computed by subtracting the institutionalized autocracy score from the institutionalized democ-
racy score; the resulting unied polity scale ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic).
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the region. There are ve geographic regions covered: Asia, Africa, America, Europe
and Oceania. We calculate the cargo trac volume within each region based only on
selected ports, although that data represents 71 percent of the actual world seaborne
trade over the ten years for which we have data.
The summary and descriptive statistics of our key variables are listed in the Table
3.1 a. As shown, close to 75 percent of all attacks succeeded over the ten years in our
sample. And close to 85 percent of all incidents occurred in or o the coasts of Asia
and Africa, while the rest took place in or o the coasts of the Americas, Oceania, and
Europe. Contrary to widespread public perception, only 20 percent of attacks in our
dataset occurred in Africa, whereas close to 65 percent of them took place somewhere in
Asia. These incidents occurred in the ports or waters of countries with real per capita
incomes of roughly $7,600 based on 2005 constant U.S. dollars, although there is a very
high variance in the per-capita income levels of countries associated with piracy attacks.
The frequency of incidents over time is slightly backloaded although spread fairly evenly,
with the average incident occurring between the fth and sixth years in our decade-long
sample (i.e., between 2002 and 2003). Examining the correlation matrix shown in the
bottom panel, we see that the probability of a successful attack, SUCCESS, is higher
in Africa than in Asia; that it is harder to successfully attack larger ships, TONNAGE;
that the success rate of attacks declines slightly with increases in per-capita income,
GDPCAP ; and that cumulative histories of successful piracy raids locally and regionally,
CUMSUCCESS and CUMSUCCESS REGION respectively, are slightly positively
related to the likelihood of successful future attacks.
Considering the top panel of Table 3.1 b, we see that attacks mostly occurred at
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harbors when the vessels were anchored or in a country's own territorial waters.24 For
every one hundred incidents recorded in our dataset, there were close to two crew deaths,
DEATH; three in which the pirates sought ransom, RANSOM ; and ve cases where
the vessels were captured in their entirety, V ESSEL. As shown in the bottom panel,
all outcomes are more likely in open and international waters, although the probability
of a successful attack is correlated negatively with WATER. Incidents where vessels
were stolen or the crew were killed are more likely in areas with higher per-capita in-
comes, but those in which cash robberies, hostage taking or ransom seeking occurred are
less likely in higher-income areas. The cumulative number of successful piracy attacks
at location i up to and including time t   1, CUMSUCCESS, is highly negatively
correlated with whether piracy attacks occurred in international waters. A longer and
successful local history of piracy attacks also correlates positively, although weakly, with
ship seizures and negatively with crew deaths and ransom seeking. The correlation of the
regional histories of piracy success, CUMSUCCESS REGION; is positive with almost
all other variables except the crew deaths. And, not surprisingly, CUMSUCCESS and
CUMSUCCESS REGION are very highly and positively correlated.
24Our variable WATER attains three values: one, if the attack occurred when the vessel was docked
or anchored in an harbor; two, if it took place in the territorial waters of a given country; and three, in
international waters. Thus, it increases with distance to the shores and state authorities.
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Table 3.1 a: Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation Matrix
1998 { 2007
n = 3362 Mean St. Dev.
SUCCESS :744 :436
AFRICA :204 :403
ASIA :645 :479
Y EAR 5:44 2:62
TONNAGE 16:8 21:6
GDPCAP 7595 39803
POLITY 4:26 4:35
MTRADECAP 1:15 1:12
CUMSUCCESS 122 170
CUM REGION 591 475
SCS AFR ASIA Y EAR TONN GDPC POL MTPC CSCS
SUCCESS 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
AFRICA :023 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
ASIA  :005  :681 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Y EAR  :021 :113  :106 1 ... ... ... ... ...
TONN  :127  :072 :083  :002 1 ... ... ... ...
GDPCAP  :062  :072 :068  :040  :023 1 ... ... ...
POLITY :069  :343 :195 :024 :057  :113 1 ... ...
MTPC :030  :339 :028 :079  :017 :013 :155 1 ...
CUMSCS :073  :256 :418 :314 :137  :053 :345 :053 1
CUM REG :015  :344 :596 :634 :047 :009 :157 :059 :588
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Table 3.1 b: Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation Matrix
1998 { 2007
n = 3362 Mean St. Dev.
SUCCESS :744 :436
WATER 1:80 :780
GDPCAP 7595 39804
POLITY 4:26 4:35
CREWHARM :528 :499
DEATH :019 :135
RANSOM :028 :165
V ESSEL :045 :208
CUMSUCCESS 122 170
CUM REGION 591 475
n = 3362 SCS WTR GDPC POL HARM DTH RNSM V ESL CSCS
SUCCESS 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
WATER  :358 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
GDPCAP  :062 :116 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
POLITY :069  :128  :113 1 ... ... ... ... ...
CREWHARM :399  :051 :038  :016 1 ... ... ... ...
DEATH :051 :061 :030 :013 :130 1 ... ... ...
RANSOM :100 :148  :012  :062 :160 :003 1 ... ...
V ESSEL :127 :088 :018 :002 :202 :128  :036 1 ...
CUMSUCC :073  :190  :053 :345 :071  :050  :054 :053 1
CUM REG :015 :029 :009 :157 :052  :001 :003 :079 :588
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3.2.2 Main Results
3.2.2.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
We derive our baseline empirical results by estimating the following reduced-form
equation:
OUTCOMEit = 1  SUCCESSit + 2  CUMSUCCESSit 1
(25)
+ it + 
it +
2007X
j=1998
 j  Ij +
29X
k=1
k  Ik + "it ,
where OUTCOMEit is an outcome of the piracy act that took place in location i at time
t; it is based on the type of violence or the nature of the appropriation involved, which
we shall explain further below.
SUCCESSit is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if pirates succeeded
in boarding the vessel; CUMSUCCESSit 1 is the cumulative count of successful attacks
that occurred at location i up to and including year t 1;  it represents incident-specic
explanatory variables related to the vessel or geographic location where the incident
occurred; 
it represents economic or political variables associated location i at time t; Ij
and Ik represent controls for time xed eects and location xed eects, with the latter
being based on the 29 locations in our database where piracy incidents were reported.25
25On this basis, we end up with ten year xed eects for 1998 through 2007; ve regional xed
eects for Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe, and the Americas; and 29 location xed eects that cover
Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana,
India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam, the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Aden,
the Singapore Strait and the Red Sea.
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The 29 locations covered in our dataset account for 3,039 observations out of the
total of 3,362, corresponding roughly to 90 percent of our data points. Since a key
variable in our analyses is the cumulative local histories of successful piracy raids, in all
of the empirical work below, we are constrained by these 3,039 observations for which
we were able to identify the location of attack.
In alternative specications, our dependent variable OUTCOMEit is either one of
three main outcomes: whether the crew were subject to some physical harm, denoted as
CREWHARMit; the crew were used for ransom demands, RANSOMit; or the attack
culminated with the pirates' seizure of the vessel, V ESSELit.
26 All of these dependent
variables are binary indicator variables, which is why our baseline empirical specications
involve Probit estimates.
In terms of the incident-specic economic or political explanatory variables in the
matrix 
it, we have per-capita GDP, its growth rate between 1998 and 2007, and the
unemployment rate at time t in location i, GDPCAPit; GROWTHit, and UNEMPit,
respectively. This matrix also includes measures of polity quality, POLITYit, and au-
tocracy, AUTOCRACYit, respectively.
27 The matrix of vessel-specic and geographic
explanatory variables,  it, includes the month, year and time of day (am or pm) of
the incident, its geographic location, as well as the gross tonnage, ag and the type of
vessel.28
26Although we chose to focus on three specic outcomes of piracy in particular, we were able to
explore other outcomes too. These include, but are not conned to, whether the attack culminated with
some or all crew members being taken hostage; the attack involved at least one crew member being
killed; whether or not the pirates stole cash from the crew or the vessel; and a more general measure of
economic damage.
27Other variables we experimented with but chose not to include in the baseline specications discussed
below include measures of political rights, civil liberties, democracy and political freedoms.
28We have dummies for the ags of 20 countries under which the targeted vessels sailed. The incidents
involving ships under these country ags account for more than 75 percent of our data. The countries
for which we have ag dummies include: Antigua, Bahamas, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Hong Kong,
75
In Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we report our baseline, reduced-form Probit estimates.
All regressions in these tables include economic as well as political and institutional
measures, in addition to a variety of basic vessel characteristics and geographic variables.
There are no xed eects in the specications reported in column (1) regressions, but
the subsequent three regressions in all three tables respectively add attack location, year
and regional xed eects.
As for vessel characteristics and geographic variables that are controlled for in
Tables 3.2 through 3.4, we include SUCCESS because the extent to which pirates can
inict physical or material harm ought to be highly conditional on pirates successfully
boarding the vessel. We include the TONNAGE of the vessels because the damage
pirates can inict could be systematically dierent for larger vessels due to size-related
characteristics that make larger ships more or less vulnerable to piracy acts. Whether
or not the incident took place when the ship was anchored at port, or cruising in the
open territorial or international seas could also have made it logistically easier or more
dicult for pirates to exact some cost. Hence, we have the inclusion of WATER as
a basic right-hand side control. We also include a measure of the volume of maritime
trade per capita of the region where the attack occurred, MTRADECAP , based on the
idea that maritime trade volumes could, independently, aect the kinds of damage the
pirates inicted.
The set of our basic economic variables as well as those for political stability and
institutional controls are self-explanatory. In any case, the main economic variables are
income per capita, GDPCAP , economic growth, GROWTH, and the unemployment
Indonesia, India, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama,
Saint Vincent, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. We also have six carrier-
type dummies: liquid containers, tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo ships, shing boats and chemical
tankers.
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rate, UNEMP . And our main controls for political stability and institutional quality
are the polity score, POLITY , and an index of whether or not the government in power
is authoritarian, AUTOCRACY .
In Table 3.2, our dependent variable is whether or not the crew was physically
harmed, CREWHARM .29 As shown, the likelihood of the crew being harmed during
a piracy incident depends strongly on whether or not the pirates successfully got on
board. But controlling for that, the crew can still escape unharmed when larger vessels
are involved or the attacks occur closer to shores and harbors. Economic factors do
come in with the predicted signs | with GDP per capita and economic growth reducing
the likelihood of crew harm and unemployment raising it. Adding xed eects for the
location of attacks, their year and geographic region, respectively in columns (2), (3) and
(4), does reveal that GDP per capita is a strongly negative and statistically signicant
determinant of the extent to which the crew was harmed during a pirate raid. The
impact of income on the incidence of piracy attacks that culminate with some physical
harm to the crew is quantitatively meaningful. Taking the average of the coecients on
GDPCAP in columns (2) through (4), we get a roughly one percent decline in attacks
with crew harm for every $10,000 increase in per-capita income. It is worthwhile to point
out, however, that this impact is not that of incomes on acts of piracy but, rather, that
of incomes on undertaking piracy which inict harm on the crew, conditional on the
success of the act.
In our column (2) specication, we see that the volume of maritime trade per
capita in the region of the attack negatively and signicantly inuences the chances of
the crew being harmed. But when all xed eects are controlled for, as we do in columns
29This is an indicator variable that attains the value of one if the pirates either threatened, physically
assaulted, kidnapped or killed someone on the crew, and is zero otherwise.
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(3) and (4), this eect switches sign and turns insignicant. As for the impact of state
authority on the impact of piracy incidents that are harmful to the crew, we get some-
what mixed results. On the one hand, polity scores come in with positive signs in three
regressions although they are never signicant. On the other hand, more authoritarian
regimes produce fewer piracy incidents as implied by AUTOCRACY yielding negative
and signicant eects in the rst three columns. Once location xed eects are intro-
duced, as we do in column (4), this latter eect disappears which is indicative of the fact
that authoritarian regimes had staying power (at least over the period between 1998 and
2007), thereby the role of AUTOCRACY being absorbed by our location xed eects.
Most importantly, the cumulative number of successful piracy attacks, denoted as
CUMSUCCESS, comes in with positive and statistically signicant eects in three of
the four specications. In essence, we nd here that a history of successful piracy attacks
at a given location signicantly improves the odds of a future attack in which the crew is
physically harmed. This eect, too, is independent of any impact local piracy experience
has on how successful pirates are in successfully boarding vessels. Thus, an interesting
question is the extent to which the local piracy experience has an indirect impact on
crew safety via pirate attacks that become more successful over time due to experience.
We shall address this issue further below.
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Table 3.2: Probit Estimates with Location-Specic LBD & Crew Assaults Out-
comes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
CUMSUCCESS 0.000827*** 0.000397 0.000647* 0.000945*
(0.000182) (0.000243) (0.000338) (0.000523)
GDPCAP -7.15e-07* -4.10e-07 -8.31e-07*** -1.60e-06***
(3.89e-07) (4.10e-07) (2.98e-07) (3.06e-07)
GROWTH 0.000357 -0.00190 0.000845 0.000973
(0.00395) (0.00293) (0.00291) (0.00285)
UNEMP 0.0410** 0.0321** 0.0337** 0.0132
(0.0167) (0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0279)
AUTOCRACY -0.0115*** -0.00804* -0.00886** 0.00447
(0.00388) (0.00422) (0.00404) (0.00288)
POLITY -0.00184 0.00871 0.000965 0.00699
(0.0157) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0158)
SUCCESS 1.510*** 1.558*** 1.489*** 1.597***
(0.105) (0.112) (0.122) (0.110)
WATER 0.173*** 0.208*** 0.270*** 0.180***
(0.0648) (0.0617) (0.0538) (0.0581)
TONNAGE -1.14e-05*** -1.06e-05*** -1.06e-05*** -1.06e-05***
(1.71e-06) (1.67e-06) (1.69e-06) (1.78e-06)
MTRADECAP -0.198 -0.378* 0.408 0.267
(0.181) (0.197) (0.511) (0.562)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 3039 3039 3039 3039
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In Table 3.3, we present the impact of our explanatory variables on the extent
to which pirates successfully sought ransom. As seen, most of the eects we already
unearthed in Table 3.2 remain in play here, although, most conspicuously, local piracy
experience seems to have lead to a shift away from piracy incidents involving ransom
demands, with only the nal specication yielding statistically signicant negative inu-
ence.
In Table 3.4, we explore the determinants of ship seizures by pirates. Our results
with vessel capture are mostly in line with those in Table 3.2, with favorable economic
factors being consistently associated with fewer attacks, which culminated in the vessel
being turned over to the pirates. One exception here appears to be the positive | and,
in the rst two regressions, signicant | role of economic growth in leading to more
incidents that culminated with vessel seizures. AUTOCRACY still suppresses acts that
culminated in vessel seizures. Most importantly, local piracy experience exerts a positive
and statistically signicant impact on ship seizures in three of our four regressions. All in
all, these ndings suggest that pirates were becoming more successful in capturing vessels
in their entirety as they accumulated more local experience in launching successful pirate
attacks.
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Table 3.3: Probit Estimates with Location-Specic LBD & Ransom Demands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
CUMSUCCESS -1.81e-05 -0.000859 -0.000792 -0.00380**
(0.000827) (0.000945) (0.00111) (0.00188)
GDPCAP -2.18e-06** -9.02e-07 -1.36e-06 0.000125**
(9.48e-07) (1.02e-06) (9.21e-07) (5.48e-05)
GROWTH 0.00443* 0.00174 0.00403 -0.00531
(0.00246) (0.00553) (0.00608) (0.00944)
UNEMP -0.000402 -0.00675 0.00108 0.304*
(0.0376) (0.0410) (0.0463) (0.157)
AUTOCRACY -0.0189*** -0.0156*** -0.0166*** -0.0147
(0.00368) (0.00518) (0.00455) (0.0108)
POLITY 0.0128 0.00885 -0.00656 -0.0626
(0.0293) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0457)
WATER 0.664*** 0.678*** 0.728*** 0.763***
(0.117) (0.119) (0.101) (0.147)
TONNAGE -9.62e-05*** -0.000102*** -0.000104*** -0.000106***
(2.63e-05) (2.71e-05) (2.79e-05) (3.54e-05)
MTRADECAP -0.458 -0.688** 0.0681 -0.267
(0.397) (0.309) (1.191) (1.732)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 2270 2270 2270 1608
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
SUCCESS dropped; predicts outcomes perfectly.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Probit Estimates with Location-Specic LBD & Ship Seizures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
CUMSUCCESS 0.00178*** 0.00183*** 0.000411 0.00162**
(0.000399) (0.000445) (0.000507) (0.000792)
GDPCAP -2.19e-06* -2.29e-06** -2.74e-06** -8.54e-06
(1.24e-06) (1.07e-06) (1.17e-06) (4.15e-05)
GROWTH 0.00537** 0.00780** 0.00895 0.00904
(0.00267) (0.00394) (0.00568) (0.00890)
UNEMP 0.00306 -0.0107 0.0700* 0.0443
(0.0288) (0.0303) (0.0425) (0.0863)
AUTOCRACY -0.00519* -0.00739** -0.0130** 0.274
(0.00299) (0.00364) (0.00569) (0.419)
POLITY -0.00568 0.00292 0.00306 0.0596
(0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0163) (0.193)
WATER 0.396*** 0.458*** 0.333*** 0.291***
(0.0922) (0.0914) (0.0823) (0.0716)
TONNAGE -5.26e-05 -4.92e-05 -4.85e-05 -4.81e-05
(3.34e-05) (3.15e-05) (3.17e-05) (3.22e-05)
MTRADECAP -0.0974 -0.0839 -0.399 -0.483
(0.202) (0.190) (0.775) (1.118)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 2270 2270 1974 1820
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
SUCCESS dropped; predicts outcomes perfectly.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.2.2.2 IV Estimates
One problem with the reduced-form estimates we discussed above stems from the
fact that three of our explanatory variables are endogenous and outcomes of the piracy
acts themselves. In particular, the variables TONNAGE and WATER are choices that
the pirates have full control over because they can | and do | decide on which ships to
attack and where. SUCCESS is not fully in control of the pirates, because whether the
latter can be successful in boarding a ship depends on many factors. But, by deciding
on the timing and logistics of and the resources devoted to each attack, the pirates do
have some inuence over this outcome too. This is why we now turn to two-stage least
squares estimates (2SLS) in which we shall instrument for these endogenous variables.
Our instrument choice is a set of (twelve) dummies for the month of attack. The
idea is that weather conditions not only are highly seasonal, but also signicantly inu-
ence whether or not attacks in the open seas or harbors succeed. The success of piracy
attacks plausibly do depend on weather conditions. This in turn might not only shift the
location of attacks closer to the shores and away from the open seas, but also make it
more or less easy to defend ships based on their size. On this basis, we shall instrument
for SUCCESS, WATER and TONNAGE. The working assumption required here is
that the incidence of pirate attacks by month is not only orthogonal to the kinds of
damage pirates inict conditional on the success rate of attacks, but also orthogonal still
to any omitted variables we might have in predicting the types of damage inicted due
to piracy.
We derive our baseline 2SLS results by estimating the following rst-stage regres-
sions:
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SUCCESSit
WATERit
TONNAGEit
9>=>; =
12X
m=1
m  Im +  it + 
it
+
2007X
j=1998
 j  Ij +
29X
k=1
k  Ik + it , (26)
We then run this second-stage equation:
OUTCOMEit = 1  dSUCCESSit + 2  dWATERit + 3  dTONNAGEit
(27)
+ it + 
it +
2007X
j=1998
 j  Ij +
29X
k=1
k  Ik + "it ,
where dSUCCESS, dWATER and dTONNAGE are the predicted values of SUCCESS,
WATER and TONNAGE but all other variables are identical to the ones in the
reduced-form specications we presented above.
Tables 3.5.a, 3.5.b and 3.5.c present our rst-stage estimates for SUCCESS,
WATER and TONNAGE respectively. As reported by the F-statistics, our instru-
ments are very strong for WATER and, for the most part, acceptable for SUCCESS
with two specications involving SUCCESS producing F-statistics above the threshold
of 10. With TONNAGE our instruments are clearly weaker with none of our F-statistics
registering above ve.
In any event, what these rst-stage results indicate is that, as the pirates gained
experience in launching successful attacks, their success rates rose signicantly and they
launched fewer attacks in the open seas, targeting larger vessels. All of these eects are
84
statistically signicant in ten of the twelve regressions for SUCCESS, WATER and
TONNAGE.
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Table 3.5.a: 2SLS IV Estimates | First Stage Results with SUCCESS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
CUMSUCCESS 0.000171*** 0.000197*** 0.000513*** 0.000132
(0.00005) (0.000053) (0.000066) (0.000122)
GDPCAP -8.01e-07*** -7.99e-07*** -9.08e-07*** -5.45e-07***
(2.17e-07) (2.18e-07) (2.11e-07) (2.29e-07)
GROWTH 0.000254 0.000563 0.00197*** 0.00124
(0.00047) (0.00052) (0.00055) (0.00085)
UNEMP -0.0123*** -0.0130*** -0.0184*** -0.00548
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0050)
AUTOCRACY 0.00343*** 0.00318** 0.00300*** -0.000140
(0.0005) (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.0012)
POLITY 0.00272 0.00427* -0.00279 0.000669
(0.0024) (0.00025) (0.00252) (0.00465)
MTRADECAP 0.0324 0.0364 0.217** 0.229*
(0.022) (0.0239) (0.103) (0.121)
JANUARY 0.0349 0.0362 0.0393 0.0520
(0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0367) (0.0362)
MAY -0.0599* -0.0597* -0.0360 -0.0374
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0361) (0.0354)
AUGUST -0.0628** -0.0576 -0.0549 -0.0389
(0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0370) (0.0363)
DECEMBER -0.0527 -0.0593* -0.0517* -0.0413
(0.0386) (0.0384) (0.0371) (0.0365)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 3039 3039 3039 3039
R-squared 0.053 0.065 0.130 0.179
F-statistics 9.31 7.70 14.95 11.40
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
FEBRUARY , MARCH, APRIL, JUNE, JULY; SEPTEMBER;
OCTOBER, NOV EMBER included but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5.b: 2SLS IV Estimates | First Stage Results with WATER
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
CUMSUCCESS -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0020*** -0.00016
(0.000085) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00016)
GDPCAP 1.9e-06*** 2.0e-06*** 2.11e-06*** -3.22e-08
(3.75e-07) (3.7e-07) (3.41e-07) (3.0e-07)
GROWTH 0.0048*** 0.0026*** -0.000159 -0.00107
(0.00081) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)
UNEMP 0.0175*** 0.0203 0.0541*** 0.00887
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0046) (0.00657)
AUTOCRACY -0.0109*** -0.0089*** -0.010*** -0.000653
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00156)
POLITY -0.0108*** -0.013*** 0.00291 -0.00414
(0.0042) (0.004) (0.0041) (0.0061)
MTRADECAP 0.0552 0.0106 0.202 -0.411***
(0.0380) (0.041) (0.166) (0.159)
APRIL 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.149*** 0.0637
(0.064) (0.062) (0.057) (0.046)
MAY 0.0953* 0.0838 0.0257 0.0141
(0.0650) (0.063) (0.0582) (0.0463)
AUGUST 0.178*** 0.158** 0.156*** 0.0860**
(0.0662) (0.065) (0.060) (0.0475)
NOV EMBER 0.150** 0.139** 0.148** 0.0585
(0.066) (0.065) (0.059) (0.0473)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 3039 3039 3039 3039
R-squared 0.119 0.162 0.292 0.559
F-statistics 22.71 21.63 41.30 66.37
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
FEBRUARY , MARCH, APRIL, JUNE, JULY; SEPTEMBER;
OCTOBER, NOV EMBER included but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5.c: 2SLS IV Estimates | First Stage Results with TONNAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
CUMSUCCESS 14.43*** 17.90*** 20.10*** 18.70***
(2.464) (2.65) (3.43) (6.43)
GDPCAP -0.00913** -0.0112 -0.00902 -0.0103*
(0.0109) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0120)
GROWTH 64.49*** 85.15*** 65.84** 20.40
(23.52) (26.17) (28.34) (44.50)
UNEMP 340.1*** 416.6*** 259.2* 167.9
(115.7) (117.8) (148.0) (263.6)
AUTOCRACY -17.59 -43.44 -24.20 -94.74
(26.65) (29.66) (30.65) (62.56)
POLITY 208.5* 162.6 205.1 -156.4
(120.6) (125.2) (131.4) (244.5)
MTRADECAP -585.8 647.9 -8,613 -11,428*
(1,099) (1,200) (5,349) (6,374)
JANUARY -2,902* -2,439 -2,452 -3,694**
(1,915) (1,916) (1,915) (1,902)
JUNE -4,179** -3,578* -3,534* -2,911
(1,941) (1,944) (1,942) (1,922)
OCTOBER -3,268** -3,197* -3,391* -3,447*
(1,864) (1,866) (1,865) (1,848)
NOV EMBER -2,378 -2,287 -2,279 -2,132
(1,918) (1,918) (1,916) (1,898)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 3039 3039 3039 3039
R-squared 0.028 0.034 0.037 0.074
F-statistics 4.77 3.98 3.89 4.16
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
FEBRUARY , MARCH, APRIL, JUNE, JULY; SEPTEMBER;
OCTOBER, NOV EMBER included but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Our second-stage results are shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, with harm to the crew
and vessel capture as our dependent variables, respectively.30 As shown in Table 3.6,
the predicted success of attacks and whether or not they occur in the open seas have
positive impact on harm to the crew in all four estimates, but none of the estimates enter
signicantly. The economic and politico-institutional measures enter these estimates in
consistence with their roles in our reduced-form specications, although they show sta-
tistical signicance in only a few cases. The local histories of successful piracy incidents
exert positive eects in all four estimates, and when no xed eects are controlled for,
they enter signicantly as well. In Table 3.7, we see that the results are mostly in line
with those in Table 3.6, although none of the explanatory variables have statistically
signicant impact on the extent to which piracy incidents culminated with ship seizures.
All in all, these results are indicative of the fact that piracy experience has altered
the outcome of attacks mainly by raising the likelihood of pirates getting on board,
successfully targeting larger vessels and launching attacks closer to land. Beyond that,
however, it seems to not have impacted the extent to which attacks led to more physical
harm to the crew or the vessels' seizure.
30We have chosen not to report the second-stage ndings for RANSOM here as they were very much
line with those for V ESSEL. Of course, all results discussed but not shown are available upon request.
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Table 3.6: 2SLS IV Second-Stage Estimates with Crew Assaults as Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
dSUCCESS 0.141 0.335 0.243 0.265
(0.539) (0.560) (0.635) (0.545)dWATER 0.0439 0.0861 0.0587 0.00968
(0.204) (0.212) (0.198) (0.242)dTONNAGE -2.45e-05 -2.11e-05 -2.02e-05 -1.31e-05
(1.61e-05) (1.76e-05) (1.80e-05) (1.58e-05)
CUMSUCCESS 0.000618** 0.000499 0.000627 0.000529
(0.000231) (0.000326) (0.000455) (0.000403)
GDPCAP -6.05e-07* -4.39e-07 -5.13e-07 -6.12e-07
(3.38e-07) (4.10e-07) (4.69e-07) (4.88e-07)
GROWTH 0.00174 0.00114 0.00211 0.000895
(0.00273) (0.00267) (0.00289) (0.00134)
UNEMP 0.0169* 0.0156* 0.0127 0.00332
(0.00916) (0.00858) (0.00990) (0.00667)
AUTOCRACY -0.00259 -0.00225 -0.00242* 0.000204
(0.00153) (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00202)
POLITY 0.00506 0.00712 0.00344 0.00107
(0.00847) (0.00751) (0.00628) (0.00614)
MTRADECAP -0.0664 -0.105 0.0856 0.0277
(0.0681) (0.0784) (0.181) (0.200)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 3039 3039 3039 3039
R-squared 0.056 0.061 0.065 0.084
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: 2SLS IV Second-Stage Estimates with Ship Seizures as Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
dSUCCESS 0.219 0.227 0.229 0.150
(0.159) (0.170) (0.190) (0.190)dWATER 0.00920 0.00173 0.0127 0.00744
(0.115) (0.125) (0.105) (0.108)dTONNAGE 5.13e-06 5.78e-06 4.67e-06 1.33e-06
(6.05e-06) (7.33e-06) (5.81e-06) (8.73e-06)
CUMSUCCESS -1.11e-05 -6.16e-05 -0.000207 5.19e-05
(0.000165) (0.000223) (0.000318) (0.000172)
GDPCAP 1.64e-07 2.15e-07 1.72e-07 -2.32e-07
(3.38e-07) (3.99e-07) (3.56e-07) (1.82e-07)
GROWTH -0.000179 -0.000290 -0.000583 -0.000195
(0.000511) (0.000816) (0.000820) (0.000744)
UNEMP -7.33e-05 -0.00119 0.00488 0.00115
(0.00254) (0.00253) (0.00532) (0.00248)
AUTOCRACY -0.00110 -0.00106 -0.00126 0.000429
(0.00144) (0.00128) (0.00123) (0.000968)
POLITY -0.00214 -0.00200 -0.000623 -0.00343
(0.00333) (0.00394) (0.00274) (0.00264)
MTRADECAP 0.000169 -0.0116 0.0103 -0.0377
(0.0215) (0.0280) (0.0938) (0.102)
YEAR FE N Y Y Y
REGION FE N N Y Y
LOCATION FE N N N Y
Observations 3039 3039 3039 3039
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.2.2.3 Alternative Specications & Robustness
While our results suggest that a history of successful piracy aided pirates in becoming
more successful or, perhaps to some extent, altering their objectives too, they do not
fully corroborate the idea that this history is a pure manifestation of learning by doing.
The reason for this is that resources devoted to piracy might have evolved over time as
well.
The descriptions of modern-era piracy leave little doubt that it is a labor- and
capital-intensive activity. With our broad sample of 3,362 observations we do not have
data to control for such inputs. But for roughly 70 percent of all incidents in our
dataset, we have a record of the number of pirates involved in the attack. Hence, for
a restricted subsample of our observations, we can control for piracy labor input. For
the 2,300 observations for which we have data on the number of pirates, we see that
each attack involved roughly six pirates, although with high variance. Most attacks took
one audacious pirate, but close to ten percent of these attacks involved more than ten
pirates, and 43 were reported to take more than twenty. We have ve incidents in which
there were more than 80 pirates involved with a maximum of 200 pirates in one case.
Controlling for changes in the pirates' physical capital stock is also a daunting
challenge. Nevertheless, recall that our dataset includes information on the extent to
which the piracy acts culminated with the appropriation of spare parts and equipment
from the vessels or the latter's seizure. Thus, ignoring depreciation, one could take the
cumulative sum of the incidents in which the pirates stole spare parts and equipment or
seized ships at a given location up to the time of the incident as a crude proxy of the
amount of physical capital available to the pirates.
This is exactly what we have done in producing the results we report in our
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next table, where PIRATES denotes the number of pirates involved in the attack and
KAPITAL represents our proxy for the physical capital pirates employed in carrying
out their raids. As shown in Table 3.8, the number of pirates typically exerts a positive
impact on the likelihood that the crew is harmed during the attack as well as the odds
that the vessel is taken full control of by the pirates. However, in only one specication
| that in column (2) where CREWHARM is the dependent variable | does this eect
enter statistically signicantly. More interestingly, we see that, when we control for the
labor and capital inputs, the local history of successful piracy acts once again starts to
positively and signicantly inuence harm inicted upon the crew. And although we
have chosen not to report our rst-stage estimates that correspond to the second-stage
outcomes reported in Table 3.8, the history of the local piracy experience still mainly
manifests itself through three channels: Even after one controls for the number of pirates
and proxies for piracy physical capital, local piracy experience produces higher odds of
attack success in general, and more success against larger vessels and in attacks closer
to land. These results suggest to us that the impact of learning-by-doing on the part of
the pirates is generally robust to the inclusion of controls for labor input and proxies for
the stock of physical capital at the disposal of pirates.
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Table 3.8: 2SLS IV Estimates with Number of Pirates & Proxies for Capital
Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES CREWHARM CREWHARM V ESSEL V ESSEL
dSUCCESS 0.471 0.450 -0.00749 -0.0893
(0.585) (0.478) (0.118) (0.0884)dWATER 0.172 0.0175 -0.0874 -0.0687
(0.175) (0.180) (0.0966) (0.0809)dTONNAGE -2.09e-05 -1.66e-05 -1.22e-06 -5.64e-06
(1.37e-05) (1.09e-05) (4.76e-06) (5.35e-06)
CUMSUCCESS 0.00132* 0.00152** -0.000711 0.000561
(0.000766) (0.000570) (0.000533) (0.000460)
PIRATES -6.28e-05 0.00346** 0.00317 0.00205
(0.00242) (0.00156) (0.00258) (0.00227)
KAPITAL -0.00466 -0.00532** 0.00409 -0.00263
(0.00426) (0.00244) (0.00243) (0.00194)
GDPCAP -5.64e-07 -6.96e-07** 4.76e-08 -2.35e-07**
(3.50e-07) (3.05e-07) (1.85e-07) (9.53e-08)
GROWTH 0.000642 0.00146 0.00125** 0.000113
(0.00255) (0.00148) (0.000548) (0.000522)
UNEMP 0.0154* 0.000297 -0.000761 0.000979
(0.00860) (0.00581) (0.00300) (0.00220)
AUTOCRACY -0.00221 3.83e-05 -0.00146** -0.000670
(0.00142) (0.00206) (0.000688) (0.000945)
POLITY 0.00542 8.28e-05 -0.000253 0.000776
(0.00952) (0.00628) (0.00284) (0.00173)
MTRADECAP -0.0420 0.0699 0.0112 -0.0481
(0.0751) (0.200) (0.0231) (0.0882)
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y
REGION FE N Y N Y
LOCATION FE N Y N Y
Observations 2083 2083 2083 2083
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Note that our dependent variables predominantly include binary outcomes data.
As such, the distribution of these variables could lend themselves most appropriately to
Probit or Poisson (negative binominal) estimation techniques. With this in mind we ran
our baseline regressions with Probit regressions. In any event, we also ran the Probit
specications in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 using linear probability models as well. We have
elected not to report on those ndings, but our qualitative results were very similar to
| in fact, in many cases stronger than | those we show in Tables 3.2 through 3.4.
Next, we investigated the extent to which the cumulative history of piracy expe-
rience inuenced future acts of piracy at a higher level of aggregation regionally. To
this end, we used our alternative series of cumulative piracy experience that tracks the
total number of successful piracy attacks at the regional level. This variable, denoted
CUMSUCCESS REGIONi(I)t 1, is the sum of attacks (in which the perpetrators came
onboard.) up to time t  1 in geographic region I (where i is located).31 We replicated
the regressions in the second and fourth columns of Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, this time
also including CUMSUCCESS REGION as an additional control. Our rst-stage re-
sults with SUCCESS; WATER and TONNAGE are not shown. But they are similar
to those we report in Tables 3.5.a through 3.5.c in that successful local piracy experi-
ence, CUMSUCCESS; helps to inuence the odds of success, SUCCESS, and leads to
more incidents closer to the shores, WATER, and aimed at larger vessels, TONNAGE,
whereas experience at the regional level, CUMSUCCESS REGION , is not as impor-
tant. Our second-stage regressions are listed on Table 3.9. As shown, the inclusion of
regional piracy history does not alter our ndings for ship seizures, with the main in-
uence of piracy experience stemming from its rst-stage role in SUCCESS; WATER
31Rceall that we have ve regions in our sample: Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe, and the Americas.
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and TONNAGE. But, as columns (1) and (2) attest, the local piracy experience mat-
ters positively in the extent to which the crew is physically harmed whereas the regional
experience does not, even after controlling for the rst-stage roles of local and regional
piracy experience.
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Table 3.9: Estimates with Location- and Region-Specic LBD & Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES CREWHARM CREWHARM V ESSEL V ESSEL
dSUCCESS 0.405 0.527 0.0111 -0.0881
(0.629) (0.480) (0.105) (0.0883)dWATER 0.201 0.0738 -0.0743 -0.0692
(0.195) (0.188) (0.0980) (0.0860)dTONNAGE -2.22e-05 -1.56e-05 -1.79e-06 -5.65e-06
(1.37e-05) (1.05e-05) (4.79e-06) (5.23e-06)
CUMSUCCESS 0.00187** 0.00168*** -0.000780 0.000521
(0.000895) (0.000554) (0.000648) (0.000521)
CUMSCS REGION -0.000236* -0.000115 0.000115 2.70e-05
(0.000131) (0.000197) (8.79e-05) (6.29e-05)
PIRATES -0.000174 0.00310* 0.00268 0.00204
(0.00226) (0.00152) (0.00246) (0.00228)
KAPITAL -0.00576 -0.00598** 0.00372 -0.00248
(0.00412) (0.00261) (0.00244) (0.00215)
GDPCAP -6.22e-07 -6.86e-07** 1.63e-08 -2.31e-07**
(3.71e-07) (2.79e-07) (1.79e-07) (9.97e-08)
GROWTH 0.000794 0.00150 0.00111** 9.63e-05
(0.00248) (0.00138) (0.000508) (0.000503)
UNEMP 0.00480 0.00105 0.00456 0.000804
(0.0105) (0.00670) (0.00294) (0.00227)
AUTOCRACY -0.00112 0.000173 -0.00175** -0.000667
(0.00177) (0.00197) (0.000846) (0.000928)
POLITY 0.00560 -6.78e-06 0.000231 0.000661
(0.00990) (0.00610) (0.00284) (0.00168)
MTRADECAP 0.0158 0.234 -0.0161 -0.0847
(0.0836) (0.316) (0.0287) (0.101)
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y
REGION FE N Y N Y
LOCATION FE N Y N Y
Observations 2083 2083 2083 2083
R-squared .003 0.028 .005 .005
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In our next set of tables, 3.10.a through 3.10.e, we carry out our IV investigations
at the regional subsample level for Asia and Africa.32 As these ndings indicate, the
role of learning-by-doing in the odds of success, place and target of attacks as well as
outcomes, such as physical harm on the crew and vessel seizures, is primarily an Asian
phenomenon. The successful Asian piracy experience inuences the odds of success and
leads to more incidents closer to the ports and focuses on larger vessels whereas the
successful African piracy experience tends to launch more attacks farther from seashore
and also aims at larger vessels.
32Recall that 85 percent of our data cover these two continents. The remainder of our observations
were scant enough for each of the other three regions of Europe, Oceania and the Americas that we were
only able to carry out region-level analyses only for Africa and Asia.
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Table 3.10.a: Estimates with LBD & Outcomes by Region | First-Stage with
SUCCESS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS. ASIA ASIA ASIA AFRICA AFRICA AFRICA
CUMSUCCESS 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0003* 0.0004 0.0005 0.00022
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00015) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0000)
GDPCAP -8e-08*** -8e-08*** -6e-08*** 3e-05** 4e-05*** 3.0e-05**
(2.0e-08) (1.9e-08) (2.1e-08) (1.3e-05) (1.3e-05) (1.6e-05)
GROWTH 0.00082 0.0008 0.0018 0.00025 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)
UNEMP -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.0173** -0.008** -0.01** -0.011**
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.008) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0051)
AUTOCR: -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
POLITY -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005 -0.006* -0.005 -0.01
(0.003) (0.003) (0.0045) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0067)
JANUARY 0.095** 0.094** 0.099** -0.0295 -0.0230 -0.0286
(0.046) (0.046) (0.0455) (0.0755) (0.076) (0.0758)
APRIL .0193 0.0162 0.0675 -0.133* -0.140* -0.144*
(0.0435) (0.0434) (0.0432) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078)
JULY 0.0540 0.0525 0.0485 -0.116 -0.113 -0.0950
(0.0453) (0.0451) (0.0448) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079)
NOV EMBER .0178 0.0148 0.0346 -0.098 -0.096 -0.071
(0.0447) (0.0446) (0.0444) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079)
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y
LOCAT. FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 2165 2165 2165 686 686 686
R-squared 0.082 0.093 0.117 0.144 0.157 0.198
F-statistics 10.6 8.39 7.42 6.25 4.72 4.44
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
MTRADECAP; FEBRUARY , MARCH, MAY , JUNE, AUGUST;
SEPTEMBER; OCTOBER, DECEMBER included but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10.b: Estimates with LBD & Outcomes by Region | First-Stage with
WATER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS. ASIA ASIA ASIA AFRICA AFRICA AFRICA
CUMSUCCESS -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.0004** 0.003*** 0.0023** 0.0029**
(0.00012) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0014)
GDPCAP 2e-06*** 2e-06*** 8e-06*** -6e-05** -7e-05** -6e-05***
(3.1e-07) (3.0e-07) (2.6e-06) (3.0e-05) (3.0e-05) (3.1e-05)
GROWTH 0.004*** 0.0033** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.0028* -0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.0016)
UNEMP 0.115*** 0.122*** -0.019* 0.0035 0.0097 0.012
(0.069) (0.007) (0.010) (0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0075)
AUTOCR: 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.0002
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
POLITY 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.019*** -0.0122 0.000878 0.0157
(0.004) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0081) (0.008) (0.010)
APRIL 0.033 0.033 0.050 0.237* 0.238* 0.239**
(0.070) (0.068) (0.055) (0.127) (0.122) (0.115)
JULY -0.171** -0.158** -0.151*** 0.0676 0.0832 0.0215
(0.073) (0.071) (0.057) (0.130) (0.124) (0.116)
AUGUST 0.191** 0.165** 0.097 0.145 0.201 0.133
(0.073) (0.072) (0.057) (0.130) (0.124) (0.118)
NOV EMBER 0.169** 0.160** 0.048 0.212* 0.216* 0.130
(0.072) (0.070) (0.056) (0.127) (0.122) (0.114)
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y
LOCAT. FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 2165 2165 2165 686 686 686
R-squared 0.255 0.301 0.557 0.262 0.338 0.436
F-statistics 40.81 35.34 70.34 13.13 12.96 13.92
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
MTRADECAP; JANUARY , FEBRUARY , MARCH, MAY , JUNE,
SEPTEMBER; OCTOBER, DECEMBER included but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10.c: Estimates with LBD & Outcomes by Region | First-Stage with
TONNAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS. ASIA ASIA ASIA AFRICA AFRICA AFRICA
CUMSUCCESS 10.64*** 10.87*** 15.38** 41.6* 46.3* 85.6**
(4.07) (4.11) (8.00) (25.0) (25.7) (38.3)
GDPCAP -0.015 -0.013 -0.0095 0.202 0.116 -0.282
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.516) (0.524) (0.693)
GROWTH 96.4** 84.80* 25.39 58.65 52.50 5.278
(46.0) (46.4) (62.4) (37.8) (38.6) (43.0)
UNEMP 1,042*** 1,082*** 576.4 184.0 212.3 253.8
(232.3) (235.3) (436.0) (164.0) (166.7) (211.6)
AUTOCRACY -246.1*** -218.0** -176.2* -29.3 -27.70 -93.7**
(89.10) (90.3) (98.0) (26.4) (26.9) (46.9)
POLITY -30.09 -6.367 -56.16 317.6 212.3 99.40
(137.5) (143.1) (243.7) (205.4) (166.7) (278.4)
JANUARY -3,243 -2,897 -4,087* -3,730 -4,072 -4,156
(2,485) (2,486) (2,479) (3,088) (3,129) (3,143)
MARCH -1,601 -1,104 -1,059 -549.2 -762.5 -1,128
(2,447) (2,454) (2,443) (3,305) (3,359) (3,404)
APRIL -1,348 -1,167 -1,316 -2,074 -2,542 -2,919
(2,359) (2,361) (2,355) (3,192) (3,241) (3,252)
OCTOBER -5,276** -5,372** -5,479 2,280 1,800 -2,231
(2,337) (2,339) (2,449) (3,216) (3,248) (3,229)
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y
LOCAT. FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 2165 2165 2165 686 686 686
R-squared 0.040 0.046 0.066 0.061 0.066 0.095
F-statistics 4.98 3.98 3.98 2.41 1.80 1.90
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses;
MTRADECAP; FEBRUARY , MAY , JUNE, JULY; AUGUST
SEPTEMBER; NOV EMBER, DECEMBER included but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10.d: Estimates with LBD & CREWHARM by Region | Second-Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ASIA ASIA ASIA AFRICA AFRICA AFRICA
dSUCCESS 1.103** 1.278** 1.338** 0.304 0.377 0.224
(0.498) (0.524) (0.508) (0.677) (0.479) (0.578)dWATER 0.172 0.251 0.264 0.397 0.297* 0.288
(0.149) (0.173) (0.178) (0.268) (0.158) (0.211)dTONNAGE -3.9e-06 -1.7e-06 1.65e-06 1.2e-05** 7.7e-06 8.5e-06
(7.8e-06) (7.3e-06) (6.8e-06) (5.2e-06) (5.5e-06) (7.93e-06)
CUMSUCCESS -0.00022 -0.00018 3.1e-05 0.0027 0.0027* -0.00081
(0.00038) (0.00039) (0.00021) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013)
GDPCAP 2.66e-07 2.58e-07 -2.21e-07 7.32e-05 6.28e-05 -8.61e-06
(4.3e-07) (4.1e-07) (1.9e-07) (4.2e-05) (4.3e-05) (0.00021)
GROWTH -0.00290 -0.00269 0.000561 -0.00365 -0.00246 0.00364
(0.00314) (0.00254) (0.00129) (0.00274) (0.00309) (0.00504)
UNEMP 0.0439* 0.0358 0.00945 -0.0106 -0.0133* -0.00443
(0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0173) (0.00989) (0.00707) (0.0141)
AUTOCRACY -0.0457 -0.0296 0.258*** 0.00199 0.000320 0.00484
(0.0445) (0.0522) (0.0674) (0.00198) (0.00315) (0.00383)
POLITY -0.0221 -0.0120 0.120*** 0.00553 0.00279 -0.0108
(0.0151) (0.0226) (0.0280) (0.0143) (0.00957) (0.0207)
MTRADECAP 0.215 0 0 -3.654* 0 0
(0.133) (0) (0) (1.641) (0) (0)
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y
LOCAT. FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 2063 2063 2063 551 551 551
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10.e: Estimates with LBD & V ESSEL by Region | Second-Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ASIA ASIA ASIA AFRICA AFRICA AFRICA
dSUCCESS 0.0180 -0.0501 0.0136 0.190 0.243 0.334
(0.378) (0.377) (0.282) (0.179) (0.166) (0.187)dWATER -0.0182 -0.00738 -0.0342 0.0906 0.111 0.0952
(0.0900) (0.108) (0.120) (0.0709) (0.0917) (0.145)dTONNAGE 2.9e-06 2.3e-06 1.4e-06 6.7e-07 7.1e-07 4.5e-07
(3.0e-06) (2.7e-06) (3.3e-06) (1.4e-06) (1.3e-06) (2.2e-06)
CUMSUCCESS -0.00018 -0.00010 7.2e-05 -0.00055 -0.00056 -0.0011
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00011) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00081)
GDPCAP 4.6e-09 -7.6e-08 -3.3e-07** -7.6e-06 -7.1e-06 -4.2e-05
(2.0e-07) (1.7e-07) (1.3e-07) (1.5e-05) (1.5e-05) (0.00013)
GROWTH 0.00054 0.00083 -0.00040 0.00075 0.00068 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.00084) (0.00073) (0.0020)
UNEMP 0.0120 0.0068 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0012
(0.007) (0.0064) (0.017) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0061)
AUTOCRACY -0.022 -0.019 0.015 -0.0008 -0.00081 -0.00055*
(0.020) (0.027) (0.050) (0.00098) (0.00095) (0.00029)
POLITY -0.0088 -0.0075 0.0013 0.0034 0.004 0.0116
(0.0089) (0.011) (0.024) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.00642)
MTRADECAP 0.0820 0 0 -0.104 0 0
(0.0660) (0) (0) (0.874) (0) (0)
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y
LOCAT. FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 2063 2063 2063 551 551 551
Standard errors clustered by location in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Although we have chosen to report a subset of the analyses we conducted, we also
experimented with a variety of alternative specications to test the robustness of our
qualitative results. For example, besides the three institutional and polity measures we
have included in the tables above, we have other related measures such as democracy,
civil liberties, political freedoms and property rights indices. We have utilized these
variables in conjunction with or in lieu of POLITY and AUTOCRACY in a variety of
alternative regressions. Our key results did not alter in any meaningful way. Although
the measures we reported on above generally produced the most signicant eects on
outcomes, the signs of their coecients were not always consistent with predictions.
While we primarily focused on and reported results for a subset of our depen-
dent variables (that is, CREWHARM , RANSOM , V ESSEL, SUCCESS; WATER
and TONNAGE), we also examined the role of our standard explanatory variables in
explaining variations in other dependent variables as well. These included specic out-
comes such as incidents that resulted in crew deaths or cargo stolen from the vessels.
But we also had at our disposal broader measures of violence or material damage, which
aggregate various outcomes we discussed above into instances of violence or material
damage.33 With our broad violence or material damage measures, we got results that
were fairly in line with what we have already reported, with learning-by-doing eects
typically producing more violent outcomes and more material damage in reduced-form
estimates and working through rst-stage eects in our IV specications. With other
specic outcomes, the results regarding the impact of learning-by-doing were sometimes
33For example, our general V IOLENCE measure attains values of zero when the crew escaped un-
harmed; one if the crew were threatened with physical violence; two if they were physically assaulted;
three if they were kidnapped and four if at least one crew member was killed. The variable GOODS, in
similar fashion, rank orders material damage inicted, ranging from none to the vessel being comman-
deered away.
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mixed and sometimes weaker. With respect to other explanatory variables, we did nd,
however, that both higher incomes per capita and polity scores produced fewer cases of
cash robberies. And higher incomes per capita also accounted for fewer threats to the
crew.
Finally, we also explored if there were non-linear time trends, but did not detect any
when our year xed eects were included. However, when the latter were removed most,
if not all, of our specications showed statistically signicant negative but declining time
trends. That is, until around 2005, we found declining incidents, but roughly sometime
around then the net eect of the time trends usually turned positive.
3.3 Conclusion
Modern pirates are learning. As a result, the nature of contemporary piracy attacks
is evolving.
We reach this conclusion on the basis of empirical work using a dataset which
includes 3,362 modern-day piracy incidents that occurred globally between 1998 and
2007. It records detailed information on the location, timing and success of each attack,
as well as the material damage and violence inicted upon the crew and the cargo.
There are also peripheral data on macroeconomic and aggregate measures of per-capita
incomes, rates of economic growth and institutional quality.
On this basis, we highlighted three main ndings: First, economic factors play a
role in the sustenance of modern maritime piracy: higher per-capita incomes and em-
ployment dampen both the physical violence and material damage of modern-day piracy.
For example, higher par-capita incomes are associated with fewer successful attacks that
culminated with cash robberies and ransom demands, while they are related more fre-
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quently with cases in which the crew escaped unharmed. Second, political institutions
and legal enforcement are also important, although not as much nor consistently as eco-
nomic factors. For instance, incidents that occur in the harbors of territorial waters of
countries with more eective polities tend to involve fewer cases in which pirates cap-
tured the vessel, robbed the crew of their cash and more incidents in which the crew
escaped safely.
Most importantly, however, we document signicant learning-by-doing and skill
accumulation among the pirates that have helped modern piracy evolve over time into a
more potent ordeal. In particular, we nd that, over the period between 1998 and 2007,
a history of successful piracy attacks locally improved the odds of future success, making
it more likely that pirates launched successful raids aimed at larger vessels closer to
land. The learning-by-doing eects are detectable even after controlling for our proxies
for capital use and labor input (the number of pirates).
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation project has both theoretically and empirically studied the real
root causes of modern maritime piracy, which began making a return in the mid-1990s.
The feature of this research is utilizing the most comprehensive and novel modern-era
piracy dataset in the empirical chapters. The dataset are mainly constructed from the
annual reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships by the International Mar-
itime Bureau (IMB) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It covers 3,362
modern-day piracy incidents that occurred internationally between 1998 and 2007. For
each incident of piracy attack, the data includes detailed information on location, date,
vessel characteristics and the numbers of pirates involved in each incident. There is also
information on the material damage and violence imposed upon the crew and the cargo.
These incident-based data are then paired with macroeconomic and aggregate measures
of per-capita incomes, rates of economic growth and institutional quality of the coun-
tries whose territorial waters either witnessed these piracy incidents or were in closest
proximity to them. The contribution of this research is oering a new empirical work
in which the quantitative work in Economics hypothesizing the reemergence of maritime
piracy is skimp.
This dissertation consists of three main essays focused on the study of three as-
pects of worldwide modern maritime piracy: (1) Extralegal Appropriation Model, (2)
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Determinants of Modern Maritime Piracy, and (3) Maritime Pirates's Learning Skill
Accumulation.
(1) Modeling the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
The rst chapter begins with a brief discussion on the root causes of modern
maritime piracy, which mostly takes place in two regions of the world: Somalia and the
Southeast Asia. The fact that a state is failed or weak is commonly known as a root
cause of the existence of piracy due to its poor economic condition. To explain the root
causes hypothetically, I extend the theoretical framework of extralegal appropriation
and production model applied to modern piracy where the economic opportunity cost
of working in extralegal ventures can be viewed as wage employment in the formal
production sector. The main results of this model are that, in equilibrium, the time
that the average family allocates to extralegal activity is increasing in its eectiveness,
in the resource endowment, in the price of the good and in the proportion of exports
but decreasing in the number of families, in the wage of productive activity, and in the
number of cargo ships.
(2) Understanding the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy
The second chapter is a reduced-form empirical application of the rst-chapter
theory on modern maritime piracy. In it, I nd evidence in favor of the extralegal
appropriation framework in that economic factors do play a role in the number of pirates
involved in attacks and the probability of the successful attack. But economic factors
also seem to alter the outcome of modern piracy attacks; accordingly, higher per-capita
incomes are associated with fewer successful attacks that culminated with cash robberies
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and vessel hijackings, while they are related more frequently with cases with cargo goods
robbery and ransom demand. I also nd that political institutions and legal enforcement
are also important, although not as much nor consistently as economic factors.
(3) Learning Piracy on the High Seas
This last chapter is coauthored with my dissertation advisor. We focus on the
evolution of piracy attacks over time due to learning-by-doing and skills accumulation.
The central result is that, even after controlling for geographic, economic and sociopolit-
ical factors as well as a variety of xed eects, learning-by-doing and skills accumulation
among the pirates seems to have played an important role in maritime piracy turning
into a more potent threat over time. In particular, we nd that a history of successful
piracy attacks locally improves the odds of future success in piracy, making it more likely
that pirates launch successful raids aimed at larger vessels closer to land. The learning-
by-doing eects are detectable even after controlling for our proxies for capital use and
labor input (the number of pirates).
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